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As Ford Motor Company celebrates its 100' anniversary; it finds itself in a
crisis due to its lack of technical proficiency. The lack of technical depth
within the workforce is the result of a deeply ingrained culture that
encourages employees to change positions every 18-24 months to vastly
diverse parts of the company. The problem is exacerbated by years of early
retirements, company sell-offs and outsourcing of technical design work to
full service suppliers. In reaction to the lack of technical competency, Ford
has undergone one of the largest reorganizations in their history. The new
organization is now centered on function with loose ties back to the many
vehicle programs. In order to encourage a new corporate culture that values
technical depth over being a generalist, Ford has also developed additional
projects within the organization. One of the most prominent is the Employee
Stability Project (ESP) and Technical Maturity Model (TMM) that focus in
on developing a technical development plan for each individual engineer.
This research analyzes the rollout of the ESP/TMM project within the Body
Engineering function (with some comparisons to the Chassis Organization).
Data was collected through two surveys conducted nine months apart and
focus group sessions. The surveys encompassed the entire Body
Engineering organization. In addition, the culture at Ford was compared
with the culture developed at one of its main rivals, Toyota. The data for
Toyota was collected through one-on-one interviews.
The result of the data collected show that entire workforce recognizes that
the lack of technical depth within the company is an issue. In addition, the
concepts and principles behind the ESP/TMM project are understood and
deemed important to the company's success. However, there is still
resistance to the adoption of the project and momentum behind the support
of the ESP/TMM project appears to be stalling. The recommendations by
the authors include reinforcing communication, recognition, and
demonstration of appropriate technical behaviors at every level within the
organization. Ford should also utilize the technical depth within the
company (in the form of senior engineers and technical specialists) upfront in
the development in new programs and as consultants at key technical
milestones to maximize their effectiveness and teaching opportunities. There
are also several recommendations around the Individual Technical
Development Plan in order to encourage its adoption and ensure its
usefulness to the technical development of the engineers. Finally, a vision of
a fully functioning, highly technical organization is described to show how
this organization can quickly adapt to future challenges that the company
may face.
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The turn of the century saw Ford Motor Company quickly
approaching its one hundred year anniversary. However, the company that
arguably had the largest impact of any organization on industry and the
American economy and culture during the last century was facing difficult
times in the new one. Ford had seen its past few programs launched with
less than stellar performances. While sales remained strong, rising program
costs, delays in launch schedules, declining quality and customer satisfaction
numbers pointed to tough times ahead. In assessing the situation,
management came to the disturbing conclusion that the highly technical
automotive company had a workforce that very little technical depth.
Within the deeply ingrained culture at Ford Motor Company,
employees had come to expect a new position every 18-24 months. This was
due, in large part to Ford 2000. The goal of the Ford 2000 reorganization
was to create a centralized, global engineering staff that is matrixed to
vehicle programs. Ford 2000's vision was to create program teams focused
on the customer. The technical development of non-core commodities was
outsourced to suppliers. Within the Ford 2000 environment, the business
aspects of a program often overshadowed the technical solutions to problems
since the business aspects were more readily understood. Instead of
encouraging employees to become technically deep, the company
encouraged employees to become "mini-CEOs" and focus in on
understanding the financials of the business. Thus, in recent history, the
company had rewarded employees who moved around the company to get a
1
breadth of different experiences rather than remained in the same job.
Because of the virtues extolled by Ford 2000, employees who performed the
same job for more than 18-24 months began to feel that their career had
stalled if they did not move. Combined with the proliferation of early
retirements and buy-outs, outsourcing of technical engineering work and
selling off portions of the company, the technical proficiency in many areas
of the company quickly eroded.
In response to this problem, Ford went through another substantial
reorganization in 2001. This new organization switched its focus back on the
core functional areas that Ford has recognized for years while still
maintaining light ties to the programs. In addition to the reorganization,
Ford Motor Company hopes to make significant change in the culture within
the company. Technical depth should be more highly valued than general
company breadth. Employee movement should be dramatically reduced as
engineers gain the experience and training to hone their skills to become
highly proficient in key technical areas within the company. The solutions to
technical issues should carry the same importance as the business details that
were so highly stressed in the previous organizations. Ford is currently
implementing the Employee Stability Project (ESP) and Technical Maturity
Model (TMM) in an attempt to address the lack of technical depth and
change the corporate culture.
In the next chapter, we outline the organizational and cultural history
over the past 13 years to present. We then discuss the ESP project and its roll
out in depth. Research and data include online surveys to the entire population
affect by the ESP that were conducted in December 2002 and August 2003. We
also conducted focus groups at three different levels in the organization to obtain
qualitative information on the ESP project. Furthermore, we conducted one on
one interviews with former Toyota employees who now work at Ford in order to
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gain insight on how Toyota develops technical depth in its engineers. The
presentation of the data is followed by an in-depth analysis and theory on the
results of the surveys, focus groups and interviews.
The final chapters include observations, recommendations and
conclusions. The lack of technical knowledge is recognized throughout the
company. It is seen as a key contributor to recent quality, timing, financial, and
warranty issues that have occurred on several recent programs within the
company. Almost everyone also felt that the ideas and principles behind the
ESP/TMM were strong and if instituted, would point the company in the right
direction. But many are still skeptical of Ford's dedication to the ESP/TMM
project. As in most large corporations, the workforce is very cynical. They are
loath to fully subscribe to something that might turn out to be the 'flavor of the
month'. Our recommendations focus on the execution of principles based on
organizational behavior and learning theory.
One of the major dimensions of the ESP efforts has been the creation of
the Senior Engineer position; however, it has been met with mixed results.
Generally, engineers have all said that the correct people were chosen for these
positions. However, it seems that there is no clearly defined role for the Senior
Engineer. The supervisors and engineers to whom we spoke felt that the Senior
Engineers were under utilized. We recommend that the Senior Engineers focus
on programs early in the development phase, where most of the critical decisions
are made. Another important role for the Senior Engineers might be as
consultants near key technical milestones. With the amount of technical depth
within the company now such a scare commodity, the real key is to focus all of
the technical expertise that the company does possess in areas where it will have
the greatest impact.
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We conclude the thesis with our vision for the future. We recommend a
slight change to the organizational structure. Ford could maintain the functional
organizations. However, we feel that supervisors and their engineers within these
organizations could be assigned to specific programs. This would allow them to
develop a relationship with a particular vehicle program and customer while
maintaining a functional focus. We also recommend that less experienced
engineers begin their careers on smaller programs from the middle of the
development phase through launch. More experienced engineers would staff
larger, more complex programs at the beginning of the development phase and
ideally, the entire way through launch. If the adoption of the ESP program is
successful, Ford will eventually grow a highly technical proficient organization.
Once this occurs, the organization has a lot of flexibility to continually gain depth
and focus on skills that will aid in the challenges that they will face in the future.
As employees of Ford Motor Company and members of the Body
Engineering organization, we feel that the lack of technical proficiency
throughout the company is one of the most critical challenges the company is
facing. Viewing Ford as a large technical system, one of the key system
constraints is that the current technical skill level is inadequate as a whole,
and varies widely from individual to individual. The rebuilding of the what
has been lost - the development of the desired technical capability across
such a large and diverse workforce will take an incredible amount resources,
time and effort. With relatively long product development cycles and even
longer product use cycles, the results to the company's bottom line are many
years off. Ford Motor Company must remain patient in this timeframe and
continue its strong support of programs like ESP/TMM. The best part about
the difficulties of changing the culture in a large, complex organization is




CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL STATE AT FORD MOTOR
COMPANY
Current State of the Company
Ford Motor Company is the world's second largest industrial corporation
and just celebrated its centennial anniversary this year. Ford has approximately
335,000 employees in 200 markets on six continents. Its automotive brands
include Aston Martin, Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, Lincoln, Mazda, Mercury and
Volvo. Its automotive-related services include Ford Credit, Quality Care and
Hertz. The company is divided into two principal activities, the automotive
segment, and the financial services segment. The automotive segment deals with
the design, manufacture, sale, and service of automobiles and automotive
components. The financial services segment deals with the financing, leasing, and
insurance of automobiles as well as the leasing and renting of cars and trucks.
The automotive segment brought in 83% of the revenue for 2000, while the
financial segment brought in the remaining 17%. The automotive industry is a
very mature market with intense competition and razor thin margins. Although
Ford generated revenues totaling $162.6 billion in 2002 (compared to revenues of
$162.4 billion in 2000 and 2001 respectively), they only earned $872 million in
profit. This is after the boom of $6.67 billion profit in 2000 and the bust of a loss
of $5.45 billion in 2001.
These numbers illustrate that Ford is going through tough times right
now; trying to maintain its leadership in the automotive industry. Ford's North
American vehicle sales and revenue dropped about 11% in 2001. Furthermore,
Ford North America lost $2.15 billion in 2001 compared to earnings of $5.03
5
billion in 2000. In order to reduce costs immediately, Ford suspended paid
overtime in early to mid 2001, drastically reduced business travel, and suspended
purchases of office supplies. In January 2002, they suspended 401K matching,
and they cut 5,000 jobs in the fall via early retirement packages. For 2002,
revenue remained flat and sales dipped slightly. Still facing stiff competition,
2003 brought more of the same pressures. Ford announced another round of job
eliminations earlier this year and cost cutting remains a key priority.
Company Culture
Ford is an enormous organization with a storied past. Ford has been a
key competitor in the automotive industry and has gone through very successful
times and very bad times in their sector. This gives Ford employees a feeling of
pride in the accomplishments of the company and creates a tone of camaraderie
for the workforce for having struggled through the bad times together. Ford has
a "family" type atmosphere. The employees identify deeply with the products
that they design and build. Everyone knows someone who drives a Ford and has
an opinion on Ford cars and trucks. When things are going well, everyone feels
good about their work. When things aren't going well, the employees often take
it personally. Of course, in a company that has been around for one hundred
years, the culture is very entrenched. The culture is slowly evolving but influence
from the past is still very evident.
Since Ford is a product driven company, the engineering organization has
the most influence and power over their products. The goal is to deliver a
manufactured product that meets all technical requirements. However, cost and
timing pressures are very evident today. This puts stress on employees to
perform in an understaffed environment created by Ford's financial and business
troubles. Employees that are "fire fighters" or are willing to put in the extra time
are the ones recognized and rewarded. In the past decade or so, employees have
also been rewarded for moving around and gaining a breadth of experiences
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across Ford Motor Company. The only people who were promoted to
management roles were people who had 'punched their ticket' in several different
functions. There was no clear technical career path. After progressing through
the general salary role ranks, an engineer not slated for management remains a
salary grade '8 for life'. Salary grade 8 is the highest non-managerial engineering
position and, as with most companies, if an employee doesn't reach a
management position by a certain point in their career, it is unlikely that they will
be promoted above a salary grade 8. We will discuss how Ford 2000 and the
previous organizational structure might have influenced this culture in the next
chapter.
Classic (functional-based) Organization - the Sloan Model
Since being established in 1903, Ford Motor Company had seen a variety
of organizational structures throughout its history. The organization throughout
much of its early years and the phenomenal growth of the Model T resembled a
factory with a small number of people (Henry Ford and his immediate advisors)
making nearly all of the key business decisions. The rapid growth internationally
of Model T set up independent manufacturing and distribution centers for Ford
vehicles in almost every country or region where the Ford had a market presence.
The impact of that strategy is still somewhat evident today, over one hundred
years later.
Copying the model established by GM's Alfred Sloan, Ford switched to a
highly functional organization throughout most of the later half of the twentieth
century. This classic organizational structure became deeply rooted in the
organizational culture of the company. The main feature of the organization is
that functional groups such as chassis, body, and powertrain were extremely
dominant. Specific vehicle lines were managed at very high levels with little
project management done at the lower levels in the organization. As a result
there was little communication between the functional groups and there was
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constant maneuvering for greater positions of power for a particular functional
group with respect to the company as a whole. Vehicles were championed by a
particular "vehicle czar" that was a high-level executive who ultimately had
enough power to get the various functional groups to cooperate. In addition,
Ford's worldwide operations were extremely fragmented with each region
developing vehicles, often with similar specifications and customer requirements,
independently of one another. Technical knowledge was also infrequently shared
between regions and types of vehicles. This resulted in Ford Motor Company
essentially having a duplication of efforts throughout the company. Often,
mistakes were repeated from program to program and there was very little
communization of processes. The financial impact of the duplication of efforts,
delays in programs and warranty costs was very significant.
Despite these apparent drawbacks, this organization did develop deep-
rooted technical expertise within the functional groups. Engineers were hired in
to a particular functional organization for a particular type of vehicle (commercial
trucks, pickup trucks, passenger cars, etc.) where they would likely spend most of
their career. Engineers then were put through an informal apprenticeship for
their first few years with the company. An initial assignment would be to design
and develop smaller parts that would have a small impact on the success of the
vehicle program. The young engineer would also work with and near a group of
engineers that had a lot of experience designing similar parts on many other
vehicle lines. In addition, the leader of the group would be a senior engineer.
This senior engineer would be in a management position and preside primarily
over the technical aspects for his section. In addition to the senior engineer,
there was also a program management supervisor that might have responsibilities
for several sections. This program management supervisor would be the link to
the particular vehicle programs and would be concerned with product timing and
costs. The program management supervisor handled nearly all of these details
personally and the individual engineer rarely attended vehicle specific meetings.
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Upper-level management at Ford made several attempts in the 1980s and
1990s to reduce the fragmentation of their worldwide operations and increase the
communication both between and amongst the functional organizations. They
met with little success. The first major program to combine the operations of
Europe and North America was the Ford Escort. The vehicle began as a joint
effort between both continents in the early 1980s. Perhaps the company tried to
start with too complicated of program by attempting to bridge both international
and functional boundaries with their first attempt. By the time the vehicle was
released in Europe and North America, it was said to only share about 10 parts.
After seeing the success that Toyota enjoyed in the decade by selling
nearly 1.4 million Corollas around the world with very small differences for
individual regions, Ford tried again to develop a world car in the late 1980s. The
CW27 platform was to produce a midsize sedan for both Europe (Ford Mondeo)
and North America (Ford Contour and Mercury Mystique). The estimated sales
volume was to top 800,000 with a three and half year development time and a
budget of $4 billion. After five and a half years of development and over $6
billion invested, the vehicles were finally released to the public. The Ford
Contour and Mercury Mystique both were disappointments in the North
American markets and only the Mondeo approached its sales goal. The vehicle
was still primarily developed in Europe with the focus on the European
customer. The Contour and Mystique faced the problems of a customer that did
not care about driving dynamics and vehicle performance as much as his
European counterpart did. The North American customer cared more about
value and vehicle package. The Contour and Mystique were priced quite close to
their larger cousins, the Taurus and the Sable. And with inadequate marketing to
explain the difference between the European styling and handling, the sales of the
Contour and Mystique were rather disappointing. Today the Contour and
Mystique are discontinued models in North America, while the Mondeo has
expanded into several different body styles in Europe.
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Ford 2000 Organization - Product Focus
Alex Trotman was hired as Ford's first foreign-born CEO in 1993. At
the time Ford Motor Company was enjoying some its best financial success in its
long history. Although Ford was losing some market share in both Europe and
North America, profits were up and Ford had half of the 10 best selling vehicle in
North America. After originally promising to keep to the status quo, a year later
Trotman announced a historical reorganizational effort that would affect the
entire company. Trotman dubbed the plan Ford 2000 and the goals of far-
reaching plan were to break down the functional chimneys that had developed
over the previous half century and eliminate much of the duplication of effort
between Europe and North America. The details of Ford 2000 were
communicated to top-level managers starting in the summer of 1994 and the new
organization was officially rolled out January 1, 1995.
The new organization was centered around 5 vehicle centers (VCs): small
front wheel drive cars in Europe and commercial trucks, personal use trucks, rear
wheel drive cars and large front wheel drive cars in North America. Its respective
VC wholly owned the product development of each vehicle line so there was no
duplication of effort across continents. Within each VC a matrix organization
was established with nearly all employees reporting to both a functional and
program Chief Engineer. Over a short time frame, the programs became much
more powerful than the functional organization. This was in many ways
deliberate. Trotman wanted employees to connect more closely with the
customer. In order to do this, the decision was made to have engineers assigned
to specific programs and be collocated with other engineers on the program
rather than with engineers performing the same function on a different program.
As a result, the vehicle program and its management dominated the attention of
the engineer, and there was relatively little exposure to the functional
management.
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Under Ford 2000, technical employees were placed in a radically different
environment than in the previous organization. Most new employees were hired
into the Ford College Graduate (FCG) program. During this two year initial
program, an FCG would have four to six rotational assignments in nearly any
area of the company of their choosing (including non-technical assignments.
After the program, the FCG would be placed on a vehicle program within the
functional organization that hired the FCG or the FCG would find her own
position using the network she had built up over the last two years. Once on a
program, an engineer would be placed in a program module team (PMT). The
PMT section would consist of engineers that were all part of the same functional
group assigned to a particular vehicle program. The PMT supervisor would be in
charge of both the technical and program management issues for the section.
The PMT supervisor would report to a manager that was in charge of the entire
function for that particular vehicle line. This manager would report directly to a
functional manager in charge of the function for the entire VC and would report
via a "dotted-line" relationship to a chief engineer in charge of the vehicle. Since
the "dotted-line" relationship was more important for day-to-day activities, it
soon grew to be much more important than the functional relationship.
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Each function has a Chief Engineer and a manager from each function assigned to each program. This
manager and his people report to the Functional Chief Engineer and are dotted line to the Chief Program
Engineer. However, the reporting relationship to the program was stronger than the functional tie as the
Chief Program Engineer actually owned the headcount for his/her program.
Figure 1. The Product Development Organization after Ford 2000
The new organization and the changing of the power structure quickly
changed the corporate culture dramatically. Since an employee was now more
exposed and had a stronger network within a particular vehicle line, he was more
likely to get a new position or promotion on that same vehicle rather than within
the same function. It soon became common practice for engineers to change to
positions in very different areas within a functional group and also between
different functional groups. At the same time, Ford's promotional practices
emphasized rewarding the "fast-risers." People were recognized for doing a lot of
varied assignments in a short period of time. There soon became an unwritten
rule that if an engineer was on the same assignment for more than two years, it
was a sign that her career was stagnating. Supervisor and managers encouraged
this movement and it quickly became institutionalized. Upper management also
continued to stress not only getting closer and closer to the customer, but for
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CEO." By changing to several positions within a program, the engineer got the
opportunity to see the program and the customer from several different angles.
A "mini-CEO" was often recognized more for his ability to program manage and
meet program cost and timing than for the ability to develop technical solutions
to engineering problems.
By the turn of the century, Ford 2000 had completely taken hold of the
corporation. There was little remaining of the previous organization. It is
important to note, that Ford enjoyed their most profitable years in their storied
history throughout the nineties. Much of Trotman's goals for Ford 2000 had
come to fruition. The three (commercial trucks had been sold off and large rear
wheel drive and large front wheel drive vehicle centers had merged into one)
vehicle centers were the focus of the organization. The workforce was highly
vehicle and customer focused. Product development at a vehicle level did not
have a large duplication of effort between Europe and North America. However,
the functional organizations within the vehicle centers were almost non-existent.
There was little functional knowledge sharing between vehicle lines and almost
none across vehicle centers. The lines of communication simply did not exist.
As a result, Ford often saw a complete redesign of vehicle systems on each new
vehicle. The original vision of a few vehicle platforms throughout the company
had also not come to fruition as each vehicle was specifically tailored for its
customer with little communication between other vehicle lines. In addition,
engineers with extensive functional experience within a single functional position
were extremely rare. As a result, early in the twenty-first century, Ford started to
see both warranty and customer satisfaction data started to flatten out and even
decline after steadily improving from the late eighties onward.
Other Organizational and Factors that helped shape Ford in the 1990s
The nineties also saw the culture of Ford Motor Company shaped by
many other factors. Ford, like nearly all of is competitors, turned to outsourcing
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as a way to control their development timing and costs. Ford determined that
transmissions, engines, and body structures were the core competencies of the
company. They increasingly started to outsource other areas of the vehicle to full
service suppliers. The original strategy with full service suppliers (FSS) was to
allow the FSS to design and engineer the commodity nearly entirely on their own.
The Ford FSS liaison would be in charge of managing the FSS in terms of
program requirements, schedule and cost. In many cases, this liaison would be an
engineer without a deep functional background in the commodity that he/she
was managing. This was not seen as a priority since a FSS contract stated that the
FSS was in charge of the engineering of the commodity. This led to several
problems, as FSS's became the normal way of doing business. First, the FSS was
primarily concerned with the business success of their own company and would
understandably work in their own best interest. Ford, in many cases, exacerbated
the situation, by often setting up an adversarial relationship with the FSS (usually
over financial considerations). Secondly, in many cases, FSS had just entered into
an environment where they were responsible for all of the technical aspects of a
commodity. They often had an engineering base that had as little of technical
experience as the Ford liaison that they were working with. As the FSS worked
on more and more programs at Ford and other manufactures, they did start to
develop more functional expertise. However, since the Ford liaison was rarely
the same throughout a single program, let alone across many programs, this
functional expertise was rarely passed on to Ford.
The nineties also saw the aggressive trend of corporation downsizing.
Ford Motor Company was no exception. The decade saw a steady stream of
corporate buy-outs and early retirements handed out to Ford employees. Not
surprisingly the focus of these buy-outs were lower-level employees that had
spent most of their careers in the old organization. Many of these employees
preferred to stay within the functional organization where their career had been
developed. Under the new corporate culture, this decision seemed to indicate
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that their career had stagnated and they were not prime candidates for promotion
or career advancement. After a decade of this process, few low-level engineers
from pre-Ford 2000 remained and even more of the company's functional depth
had been removed from the organization.
Finally, in a continuation of corporate downsizing and outsourcing, Ford
sold off many aspects of their business that were not considered core to their
fundamental role of vehicle manufacturer. The principal sell-off was all
remaining non-core engineering functions that were not already out-sourced.
Following GM's example with Delphi, Ford created and then spun-off Visteon.
Visteon contained all engineering not related to engines, transmissions, and body
structures. The idea was for Visteon to remain a preferred supplier to Ford while
allowing Visteon to seek FSS relationships with other companies and Ford to
focus on their core competencies.
After spinning off Visteon, Ford relied on full-service suppliers to do the
engineering work not part of the core competencies mentioned above. Initially
this decision proved to be very profitable. However, this business decision
quickly proved to be more demanding and challenging than Ford realized. The
full service suppliers, understandably, were extremely interested in their own
company's welfare and profitably. When situations arose where the best interests
of the full service supplier were at odds with Ford's, the full service suppliers
obviously leaned towards making the decision to benefit themselves. Ford
thought it could handle the relationship with the full service supplier with
engineers with limited experience in the details of the particular commodity.
Ford engineer would act as a program manager and a liaison between the FSS and
Ford. However, Ford made a miscalculation in this regard. It was assumed that
these commodities were very well understood and all of their interfaces to the
rest of the systems in the vehicle were clearly identified and understood. This
was not always the case. In addition, the full service suppliers also had engineers
15
that did not all have a deep-rooted technical background in the commodity and it
takes some level of technical competence on the Ford engineer's part to
recognize this lack of depth. A deep technical understanding was also required by
the Ford engineer to evaluate the decisions made by the FSS. This knowledge
was required to provide technical support to the FSS, determine feasibility and
robustness of designs, and to evaluate the financials of the FSS services. In other
words, a technical background in the appropriate functional area was necessary to
protect Ford's best interests. Ford assumed that this technical knowledge was a
commodity that was easy to obtain and use when necessary. Experience has
shown that this is not the case.
Current Organization - Functional Focus
In the wake of the atmosphere described above, Ford Motor Company
went through another major reorganization in 2001. The purpose of the
reorganization was to get more focus on technical competence in the wake of
rising costs and quality problems. However, the company recognized that the
identification on the employees with products and customers had a lot of value.
In addition, they wanted to prevent situations where there were power struggles
between the functional organizations like what they saw in the pre-Ford 2000 era.
The new organization, like the previous one, is a matrix organization.
However, in the new organization, the functional ties are meant to be more direct
and powerful than the product or program ones. Engineers reported directly to a
functional supervisor. Depending on the organization, this functional supervisor
can be in charge of a particular function for a particular vehicle program (for
example, the functional supervisor can be in charge of body structures for the
Explorer program) or she can be in charge of a particular function for one of the
five vehicle groups (for example she could be in charge of locks and mechanism
for all Ford SUVs. The engineers undemeath the supervisor might either be in
charge of all the locks and mechanisms for a particular SUV program or be in
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charge of a single commodity (like door mechanisms) for the whole SUV line-
up). Typically, a supervisor will have between three and six engineers reporting
to her. The organizational layout decision is left up to the particular functional
manager. The functional manger has between three and eight functional
supervisors reporting to her. Finally, there is a chief functional engineer that has
all of the functional managers for a particular commodity (body, chassis,
powertrain, etc) reporting to him for one of the five vehicle groups. A majority
of the engineering function falls within this organizational structure. It is
commonly referred to as the backbone or spine. The purpose of the spine is to
pull together all of the engineers that perform similar technical functions under
the same management. The idea is to quickly communicate and share ideas
within this community.
The chief functional engineers also have supervisors reporting to them
that act as a liaison to all of the vehicle programs within their functional
organization. These supervisors are referred to as program management team
(PMT) supervisors. It is their responsibility to communicate the needs of the
vehicle programs back to the engineers in the backbone. While the backbone
supervisor is in charge of the technical details, the PMT leader is responsible for
the cost, weight, timing and other program management details of the designs.
Often a PMT supervisor will have a small number of engineers reporting to him
to aid in these program management activities.
The programs still maintain a chief engineer in charge of the program,
now referred to as the Chief Nameplate Engineer (CNE). However, all of the
engineering work is essentially "farmed out" to the backbone. Thus, the role of
the CNE is predominantly to manage the business aspects of the vehicle program
and managing trade-offs between the different functions (body, chassis,
powertrain, etc). During critical times of the program, these program chiefs have
to work with the functional chiefs to ensure there are enough human resources
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available to support all of the work required by the programs within the vehicle
center. Each vehicle center also has a director. Reporting to this director is the
functional engineering director who has all of the chief functional engineers
reporting to her and the chief program engineers. The vehicle center director
ultimately has the responsibility to ensure that the programs for his vehicle center
are delivered on time, within budget and with high quality.
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Figure 2. The Product Development Organization after 2001 Re-Org
Comparing this organization to the previous one, the functional groups
definitely have a lot more power with a chief functional engineer enjoying an
equal amount of power as a chief program engineer. Engineers in general feel
more connected with functional groups than with a program, but they still have
extensive contact with the programs that they are working with. As may be
expected from the above description, there is quite a bit of tension between the
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functional organization and the program teams for resources. The program
teams are not used to not having direct control of their engineering resources.
They must now work with the functional chiefs to ensure that they have enough
support for their programs. Trying to balance several different programs, all with
their own timing plans and demands is one of the main responsibilities of the
chief functional engineer. This most recent reorganization has effectively
elevated the functions to the same level of power as the programs. However, due
to the impacts of the previous organization, the engineering technical knowledge
is not sufficient at this point to make this new structure work. Ford has
recognized this and has attempted to address these problems with projects like
the Employee Stability Project (ESP) and the Technical Maturity Model (TMM).
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Chapter 3
THE ESP AND TMM PROJECT
Description of ESP and TMM programs
Within the deeply ingrained culture developed at Ford Motor Company,
employees have come to expect a new position every 18-24 months. Ford has
rewarded employees who move around the company to get a breadth of different
experiences. This phenomenon began with the reorganization under the Ford
2000 initiative. While the reorganization only occurred in the mid-1990s, it was
quickly adopted by the entire company and had taken deep hold within most
individuals. Employees who perform the same job for more than 18-24 months
begin to feel that their career has stalled if they do not move. Combined with
early retirement plans over the past decade, the result has been an erosion of
technical competence within the company.
Although management recognizes this issue, several past attempts to
address this issue have not been successful. Ford is currently implementing the
Experience and Stability Project (ESP) across different functional organizations
to address this problem. In 2002, eight initiatives were identified in Product
Development's Business Plan. One of those initiatives was the Experience and
Stability of Personnel. In February 2002, a team of Product Development
Operations and Human Resource leaders established the ESP Project's
governance structure. The work on the ESP Project has centered on three key
points:
1) The desire that engineers develop technical depth and expertise in
identified competency areas
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2) The need to create an infrastructure to value and support the
development of engineering expertise and competency
3) Creating practices and processes that will promote a culture consistent
with these goals
Action Teams were formed to execute the plans within each function.
To focus and align the teams, principles were developed to provide direction and
to establish a common vision for their work and recommendations. They are:
" Technical depth and leadership is as important to the Company as
managerial leadership
" Elevate the Engineer to a position of respect
" Foster a sense of pride and satisfaction in the Engineer
" Create an environment that offers both psychological and material
rewards
" Remove barriers that inhibit Engineers from practicing their profession
* Establish the expectation that technical excellence is a fundamental
requirement within PD
The Action Teams were formed to design and develop Technical
Maturity Models (TMM) and supporting infrastructure for each functional
activity. The TMM design teams were comprised of engineers from a variety of
salary grades and leadership levels. The TMM is a tool for PD engineers and
technicians that describes expected competencies in key areas. There are 12
different competencies for Body Engineering (see Table 1).
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Body Engineering TMM
1. Technology Development - Translates emerging trends into concept ready applications
supporting corporate/program needs
2. Requirements/Functions - Demonstrates ability to translate Corporate, regulatory, and customer
requirements into Engineering deliverables with knowledge of system capability and limitations of
current technology
3. Target Setting/Cascade and Architecture - Identifies and cascades attribute values that meet
customer needs and corporate objectives with understanding of system interactions. Knows how
architecture constrains functions and impact cost and quality. Makes appropriate architecture
selection.
4. System and Component Creation, Integration and Package - Integrates concepts, technologies,
and processes into feasible system and component designs that meet program targets,
requirements, and package constraints. Identifies tunable system parameters with sufficient
range.
5. Design Feasibility and Materials - Translates system designs into feasible-to-manufacture
detailed drawings and specifications so the product meets the functional constraints and other
program objectives.
6. Development - Selects values and tolerances that meet vehicle performance objectives across
the range of expected usage.
7. Quality, Robustness, and Reliability Engineering - Applies robustness and reliability tools and
methodologies to achieve a design that meets intended function, that is mistake-free, and robust
to the 5 sources of noise, for the useful life of product.
8. Design Verification and Engineering Sign-Off (Design Validation) - Plans, conducts, and analyzes
development and verification testing (physical and analytical) with reference to targets and
requirements.
9. Product Launch - Understands manufacturing and assembly processes and capabilities to
produce the components or system. Specifies design/datum strategy to support efficient,
repeatable manufacturing and assembly processes. Integrates design into the production
environment.
10. Tools and Methodologies - Understands and uses appropriate tools, methods, processes, and
computer systems to accomplish design, development, and release of the product or system.
11. Supplier Management - Provides direction and guidance to suppliers ensuring that their products
and services meet technical requirements and program objectives. Leverages the most
competent suppliers and builds the capability of the supply base.
12. 6-Sigma - Demonstrates knowledge and application of Six Sigma: Define- Measure-Analyze-
Improve-Control (DMAIC) and Design for Six-Sigma: Define-Characterize-Optimize-Verify
(DCOV) breakthrough methodologies.
Table 1. Competencies of Body Engineering TMM
The TMM tool is to be used in conjunction with the 'discipline-specific
mastery lists' to:
" Self evaluate technical job performance
* Engage in development discussion with supervisors and mentors
" Map personal developmental goals
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In respect to the competencies, there are three different levels of
proficiency at which engineers can rate themselves; see Figure 3 for definitions.
Proficiency Definitions
Stage I - Acquiring/Novice: Is aware of the skill/task, the basic knowledge concepts, or the
process for doing something. Knows who to go to for assistance and information.
> Operate: To control the functioning of a process
> Understand: To comprehend the process and associated terminology
Stage Ila - Applying/User: Has sufficient knowledge, skill, or expertise to perform effectively
without assistance. Can apply knowledge and skills on a day-to-day basis.
> Troubleshoot: To identify, locate, resolve, and contain process problems
>Improve: To identify and implement process improvements, by defining permanent
corrective action
Stage 1ib - Applying/Expert: Has extensive knowledge, skill, and experience. Is considered
the subject matter expert. Can lead applications of knowledge and skills. Intelligently adapts
parts for reuse.
> Invent/refine: To innovate, by refinement or redesign, as well as implement the
process. Takes an advocacy position in reuse and commonality as appropriate
Figure 3. Definitions of Proficiency Levels
For each function there are very specific and detailed descriptions of what
it means to be at a particular proficiency level within a specific competency. See
Figure 4 for an example from the Body Engineering TMM, under the
competency Design Verification and Engineering Sign-Off (Design Validation).
m Participates in the development
of test plans
" Supports the execution of tests
m Learns to use the appropriate
tools to analyze data
- Understands the difference
between a test failure and a
design failure
" Learns vehicle, subsystem, and
component level test methods as
required
" Acquires knowledge of
development/validation tools
(statistical methods, CAE, etc.)
" Assesses relevant vehicle, system,
component level tests and selects
appropriately
" Translates DVP&R into an efficient
test plan that maximizes the use of
prototypes
" Executes the required test plan and
analyzes data in a timely manner
" Ensures that all elements of the
DVP/DCP/PV are covered by
physical or analytical testing
" Analyzes test results and
determines pass/fail based on
requirements and/or expectations
" Can determine whether there was a
test-induced failure or a failure due
to design
" Leads the evaluation of system,
sub-system, component level test
DVP/PV and updates if required
" Is a consultant to other engineers
on the development of complex
test plans
" Demonstrates the ability to
consistently perform high quality
testing and data analysis in a
timely manner
" Drives the correlation of analytical
and physical test results to
customer usage
" Develops new test/data analysis
methods to improve test capability
and/or efficiency
" Is a consultant to other engineers
in reviewing unexpected results
nnrl nnnmnIinQ
Figure 4. Examples of Proficiency within Design Verification Competency
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Senior Engineers
The ESP project also established a new position within the engineering
community called a senior engineer. Senior engineers are designated by tide (it is
not a management level position in responsibility or salary grade) and are
determined by the functional chief engineers. These senior engineers are
recognized for achieving a deep functional expertise in a particular functional area
within the company. The role of the senior engineer varies by position and is
discussed later in more detail. The creation of the Senior Engineer position was
intended to reward experienced GSR engineers and elevate them as examples of
technical maturity.
Current Status of the Roll Out
The team began implementing ESP by rolling out the project to a subset
of Body Engineering, what they called the 'pilot of the pilot'. In June 2002, the
functional chiefs and managers attended an all-day offsite. Here, they learned
about ESP and TMM and were trained to educate their employees. In July
2002, about 200 body engineers learned about ESP/TMM from their
management in all-day workshops. In August 2002, the HR team did electronic
surveys of those who went through the training as well as focus groups to gain
more in-depth qualitative feedback. We will discuss these results in the Analysis
section.
Using course corrections based on the feedback obtained from the Body
Engineering Pilot of the Pilot, the team rolled ESP/TMM out to the rest of the
Body Engineering community in December 2002. In March of 2003, ESP/TMM
rollouts began in Chassis Engineering. And, in May 2003, ESP/TMM rollouts
began in Powertrain Engineering. These occurred with similar logistics - the
chiefs and managers were trained first, and they then trained the GSR's and
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LL6's. This means that the ESP/TMM project has been rolled out to all
functional activities except for Electrical and Vehicle Engineering. They are in
the process of developing their TMM and are planning to roll ESP/TMM out to
the Electrical and Vehicle Engineering organizations in 2004.
Another round of e-surveys and focus groups were conducted in August
2003. The purpose of these surveys was to determine how the training was
received in Body, Chassis, and Powertrain and identify any course corrections.
Again, the results will be discussed in the Analysis section.
Ideal Vision of the Future of ESP/TMM
Present and future business conditions indicate a need for greater
technical depth and less chum within the PD workforce. The ESP project is one
of several initiatives intended to create practices and processes to improve PD's
business performance in the long-term. The ESP project's key objective is to
promote and encourage the technical depth of Ford's engineers. The project
intends to be a long-lasting change that becomes ingrained within PD's
organizational culture.
The TMM is tool within ESP intended to provide a model for engineers
to enhance their technical depth and for PD/HR to build the supporting
infrastructure components needed to ingrain the changes into our organizational
culture. By utilizing the opportunity for professional growth that the TMM
provides, engineers will increase their technical knowledge and skills, will deliver
superior products, and will strengthen their engineering careers.
Richard Parry-Jones, Executive Vice President of Technical Affairs, said,
"My vision for the engineering work force is that we will be a stable team that
works extremely well functionally as well as cross functionally, and where, above
all, individual expertise and technical depth is recognized and deeply respected."
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And Bill Osborne, Truck Engineering Director, said, "I think it's a critical
initiative because it's one of the key elements for the health of Ford Motor
Company - developing a stable and technically excellent engineering workforce.
It will determine the long-term ability for the company to deliver great products
on a consistent basis."
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Chapter 4
LITERATURE REVIEW OF CULTURE CHANGE
What is necessary for culture change in an organization?
Sandar and T.J. Larkin have several suggestions for successful
communication of change in their article, "Reaching and Changing Frontline
Employees". One of their recommendations is to resist the urge to verbally
communicate values. To a largely cynical workforce, the words will most likely
sound trite. They point out that it's far more effective to communicate your
values by your actions, not what you say. For example, if an accountant were to
hand you a business card with "I do not lie, cheat, or steal" on it, that would be
suspicious. It is far more effective to rather have a track record of not lying,
stealing, or cheating than to just tell someone that you don't. This, of course can
take considerable time and effort. Too many companies do not exert the extra
effort to find and state facts that reinforce the initiative, they would rather simply
wrap the change in catchy words.
Larkin and Larkin also point out that there is no substitute for face-to-
face individual communication. Videos, publications, and large meetings just
aren't as effective means of communicating change. People may refer to videos
to gain information, but they don't inspire people to change. The asynchronous
one-way communication to an assembled audience also leaves the subject open to
criticism and ridicule 'behind the speaker's back'. With publications, you don't
need to assemble an audience. But, they are untrustworthy and are often
incomprehensible. Again, a booklet is no substitute for dialogue. Now,
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publications can be valuable supplemental communication. They can guide a
conversation or can be used for reference after the initial communication.
Companies often choose large meetings to communicate change
initiatives. Unfortunately, large meetings have some of the same problems of
videos. It's mostly one-way communication to a large crowd. People are more
likely to attack change rather than support it in a crowd mentality. A clear
illustration of the superiority of one on one communication is the rumor mill. A
company can have all of the meetings and send as many emails as they can, and
they will never spread information as quickly and efficiently as the rumor mill.
Finally, and most importantly, Larkin and Larkin said that change should
be targeted to supervisors on the front line. At most companies, employees have
a great mistrust of senior management. The first words the employees on the
front line should hear about a change should come from the person to which
they are professionally closest to, their supervisor. Several studies show that
employees prefer their immediate supervisors as sources of information. Larkin
and Larkin recommend holding two rounds of supervisor briefings. In the first
round, the senior manager explains the change and asks the supervisors for their
opinions. The senior manager takes these recommendations back to the change
team and they should incorporate as much as possible. People are always more
apt to support an effort in which they were involved. In the second round of
briefings, the senior manager reports on the status of the recommendations and
explains the final plan.
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert Sutton provide some practical advice in their
HBS article, "The Smart Talk Trap." They said that organizations that are able to
overcome the paralysis of knowing and not doing share five characteristics. First,
they have leaders that know and do the work. When leaders have the knowledge
of what their company's day-to-day work entails, they are better able to separate
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'smart talk' from discussions that will realistically produce results. Second, these
organizations have a bias for plain language and simple concepts - simplify,
simplify, simplify. Third, they frame questions by asking, "how," not just "why."
These organizations have informal rules on how ideas are analyzed that prevent a
culture of criticism from flourishing. They ask, "How can we overcome these
obstacles?" This fosters productive discussions that lead to problem solving.
Forth, they have strong mechanisms to close the loop. Discussion is fine, but
they must have a mechanism that ensures that decisions that are reached are
actually implemented. And fifth, these successful organizations believe that
experience is the best teacher - learning by doing. Sometimes, this means making
a decision before you have every single piece of information. David Kelley, CEO
of IDEO Product Development said that, "enlightened trial and error
outperforms the planning of flawless intellects."
Why culture change usually fails in large organizations
There are many articles on why culture change fails in large organizations.
Conversely, if a company can learn from and mitigate these failures, then it will
help them successfully change their culture. In their article, "The Smart Talk
Trap," Pfeffer and Sutton discuss the human propensity to allow talk to substitute
for action. In many companies, people act as if discussing a problem,
formulating decisions, and drawing up plans for action are the same as fixing the
issue at hand. They have coined the phrase 'Smart Talk' to describe a particularly
insidious type of talk, which inhibits action. Business schools and corporate
culture often reinforce this 'Smart Talk' by equating leadership potential with the
ability to speak intelligently - and often. Such people also usually exhibit an even
more dangerous aspect of smart talk: they focus on the negative and they favor
unnecessarily complex or abstract language. The tendency to focus on the
negative usually lapses into criticism for criticism's sake. And, the use of
unnecessarily complex language, while sounding good, confuses people. Both
tendencies bring action plans to a halt.
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In Paul Strebel's Harvard Business Review article, "Why Do Employees
Resist Change?," he reports that the success rate of corporate reengineering
among Fortune 1,000 companies is well below 50%, possibly as low as 2 0%.
These widespread difficulties have at least one common root - managers and
their employees view change differently. Managers must put themselves in their
employees' shoes to understand how change looks from that perspective and to
examine the terms of the "personal compacts" between employees and the
company. Personal compacts are reciprocal obligations and mutual
commitments, both stated and implied that define the relationship between
employees and organizations. Unless managers define new terms and persuade
employees to accept them, it is unrealistic for managers to expect employees to
fully buy into changes that alter the status quo.
These personal compacts have 3 common dimensions - formal,
psychological, and social. The formal dimension captures the basic tasks and
performance requirements for a job: including: What am I supposed to do? What
help will I get? How and when will my performance evaluated, and in what form?
What will I be paid and how does that relate to my performance evaluation?
Unfortunately, many managers stop here when anticipating how change will
affect employees
The psychological dimension addresses aspects of the employment
relationship that are mainly implicit - elements of mutual expectation and
reciprocal agreement that arise from feelings of trust and dependence. For
example: How hard will I really have to work? What recognition, financial reward
or other personal satisfaction will I get for my efforts? Are the rewards worth it?
A manager's sensitivity to this dimension of his or her relationship with
subordinates is crucial to gaining commitment to new goals and performance
standards.
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The social dimension is about the unspoken rules that apply to career
development, promotions, decision making, conflict resolution, resource
allocation, risk sharing and layoffs, answering the questions: Are my values similar
to those of others in the organization? What are the real rules that determine who
gets what in this company? This is often the dimension of a personal compact
that is undermined most in a change initiative when conflicts arise and
communication breaks down. Moreover, it is the dimension along which
management's credibility, once lost, is most difficult to recover.
The revision of personal compacts occurs in 3 phases:
" Leaders draw attention to the need for change and establish the
context for revising compacts
" They initiate a process in which employees are able to revise and buy
into new compact terms
* They lock in commitments with new formal and informal rules
Unless the revision of personal compacts is treated as integral to the
change process, companies will not accomplish their goals. Leaders must take
charge of the process and address each dimension.
John P. Kotter studied transformation initiatives in more than 100 diverse
companies and published his findings in a Harvard Business Review article titled,
"Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail". He detected several trends
in his observations of why these companies' initiatives were unsuccessful. Kotter
summarizes these trends in eight common errors.
Error #1: Not Establishing a Great Enough Sense of Urgency -
Sometimes, executives underestimate how hard it can be to get people out of
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their comfort zone. Management's usual mandate is to minimize risk and keep
the current system operating. This first step is essential. Without motivation,
people will not cooperate and the effort goes nowhere.
Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful Enough Guiding Coalition -
Companies that fail in this phase underestimate the difficulties of producing
change and thus the importance of a powerful guiding coalition. At times, they
lack a history of teamwork between upper management and therefore undervalue
this type of coalition. Some expect the initiative to be led by HR, a consulting
group, or a strategic planning committee instead of by the people who actually
have the power - the leaders of the organizations where the actual change is to
take place.
Error #3: Lacking a Vision - Kotter said that in every successful
transformation, the company developed a picture of the future that was easy to
communicate to customers, stockholders, and employees. The vision helped to
clarify the direction in which the organization wished to move.
He speaks of one company who gave out 4-inch thick notebooks spelling
out procedures, goals, methods, and deadlines for the change effort in great
detail. Most of the employees were overwhelmed or confused. The thick
notebooks did not rally them together or inspire change.
Error #4: Under Communicating the Vision by a Factor of Ten - With
respect to communication, Kotter said that there were three common failures.
One type of communication error is when a company develops a good
transformation vision and then communicates it via a single meeting or memo.
For scope, this might constitute about .0001% of the yearly intra-company
communication. The second type of communication error is when the head of
the organization makes a lot of speeches to employees. This might be about
.0005% of the total yearly communication. The third type of error is when much
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more effort goes into newsletters and speeches, but some very senior executives
still behave in ways that conflict with the vision. The consequence is that
cynicism among the employees goes up while the belief in the initiative goes
down.
Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to the New Vision - In order for the
initiative to succeed, the company must remove all obstacles. These obstacles
might include organizational structures that prevent the successful
implementation of the new initiative, compensation or performance appraisal
systems that reward behaviors which conflict with the values of the initiative, or
even an executive who is clearly undermining the initiative. People, processes,
and systems must be aligned to the new initiative in order for it to succeed.
Error #6: Not Systematically Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins
- Real transformation takes time, and a renewal effort can lose momentum if
there are no short term goals to meet and celebrate. Most people won't join the
effort unless they see positive results within 12-24 months. If there are no short-
term victories, many people assume that the initiative will not succeed and they
give up.
Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon - After a few years, companies
often declare victory at the first clear performance improvement. While
celebrating a win is fine, declaring the war won can be catastrophic. The
transformation process can take 5-10 years. Until the transformation truly takes
root, new approaches are fragile and subject to regression to the old ways.
Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes in the Corporation's Culture -
Transformation truly occurs when the changes become the "way we do things
around here". As with the prior phase, until new behaviors are rooted in social
norms and shared values, they are subject to degradation as soon as the pressure
for change is removed. Kotter said that there are two important factors to
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institutionalizing change in corporate culture. One is to clearly show the
employees how the new approaches, behaviors, and attitudes have helped
improve the company's performance. Left to their own devices, the employees
might not see the cause and effect of the new improvements. Or, they might
contribute improvements in performance to some other unrelated cause. The
second factor is ensuring that the next generation of upper management
personifies the new approach. If new executives do not personify the new
behaviors, the signs of renewal will disappear and regress to the old practices.
Learning Within a Community of Practice
John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid present a holistic analysis of working,
learning, and innovation within work organizations in their article,
"Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice: Toward a Unified View
of Working, Learning, and Innovation". They note that obstacles to work,
learning, and innovation within organizations can be traced to the discrepancies
between the abstractions of work being done and actual practice. That is, formal
definitions of work (such as office procedures) and learning (e.g., knowledge) are
abstractions of actual practice. They inevitably and intentionally omit the details.
In society and many corporate cultures, the details of practice have become to be
seen as nonessential, unimportant, and easily developed once the relevant 'big
picture' abstractions are understood. Thus, education, training, and technology
design generally focus on abstraction representations to the detriment, if not the
exclusion of actual practice. It is the actual practices that determine the success
or failure of an organization. Abstractions detached from practice obscure the
details of the actual work. Without a clear understanding of the intricacies of
actual work practices and the role they play, the organization cannot hope to
engender and disseminate knowledge throughout its ranks.
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger discuss effective and ineffective ways that
people learn technical knowledge on the job in their book, Situated Learning,
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Legitimate peripheral participation. Corporations conventionally endorse abstract
knowledge over actual practice in most training courses. The result is to separate
learning from working, and more significantly, learners from workers. The
authors advise that learning by working is the soundest method of propagating
knowledge. By learning through practice, employees (often new hires) acquire
the ability to behave as members of the work community. They learn about
becoming a practitioner, they do not simply learn about practice. However, they
also point out that there is power in working in the periphery - as long as the
employee is involved and is a part of the 'community of practice'. Being in the
periphery allows one the opportunity to observe, see the 'big picture', and be
more objective. Thus, Lave and Wenger coined the phrase 'Legitimate Peripheral
Participation'. Again, legitimacy is required to ensure that the learner is a true
member of the 'community of practice' and not isolated as only an observer.
Furthermore, if training is designed so that the learners are denied the
opportunity to observe the activity of practitioners, learning is inevitably
impoverished.
How long does meaningful large cultural change usually take?
Leaders of successful cultural change understand that true change takes
years, not months. Kotter discussed one of the most successful transformations
that he observed over a seven-year period. Quantifying the amount of change on
a scale of 1-10 (1 being low and 10 being high), year one received a score of 2,
year two a 4, year three a 3, year four a 7, year five an 8, year six a 4, and year
seven a 2. The peak of the amount of change occurred in year five, a full 36
months after the first set of visible wins. The company must have a long-term
outlook and have patience and perseverance through the long process of





In order to learn from the experience of other companies, we conducted
interviews to collect qualitative information on how Toyota achieves the technical
development of their engineers. Interviews included only the interviewee plus
either one or both of the authors. We interviewed five Ford employees with
various perspectives and experience with Toyota: a young engineer at Ford who
co-op'd with Toyota while getting her graduate degree, a engineer at Ford who
worked at a Toyota Kiretsu (co-owned supplier), a Ford Marketing manager
without a technical degree who worked at the Toyota's Numee plant as a quality
supervisor, a Ford Purchasing Systems director who worked in purchasing at a
US Toyota manufacturing plant, and a Ford director who did his PhD
dissertation comparing Ford and Toyota. See Appendix A for a list of thought
starter questions that we used in our interviews.
These questions dealt with technical career paths at Toyota and asked
how the key points of the ESP project related to Toyota. Note that these
questions were shared with the interviewees as thought starters to obtain
qualitative information from a small sample size. We did not necessarily obtain
an answer to every question from every interviewee. We reviewed our notes from




The technical development of Toyota engineers in Japan and in the US is
similar, but with slight differences. At Toyota Technical Center (TTC), new hires
go through two weeks of training: Toyota culture, CAD, etc. Then, people who
have openings come and pitch their jobs. The new hires then rank the open
positions by their preference. One usually gets their first choice. Engineers stay
in the same position, they do not move around cross-functionally or cross-
platform. At Toyota Japan, large classes of new engineers are hired right out of
school. They spend 6-8 months in training, selling cars door-to-door, and
working at the assembly plant. Then, the new hires go through interviews and
are matched to open positions. They will remain in this position for 6-8 years.
They will most likely remain within this department for the rest of their career.
There are a couple of other interesting things to note. Toyota does not usually
hire new engineers with master's degrees. They feel that no one can train an
engineer better than they can on the job. Also, placement into a department can
be somewhat arbitrary at times (as at Ford). For example, an electrical engineer
might end up in Body Engineering. Again, Toyota feels that they will teach the
engineer what they need to know on the job.
Senior Engineers as Mentors
In Japan, new hire engineers are assigned both a mentor and a senior
engineer. The mentor is someone outside of their chain of management who
advises them on a special project which they work on separate from their actual
job. The special project is similar to a thesis. It is intended to benefit Toyota as
well as provide another avenue for the new engineer to learn about Toyota. At
TTC, new engineers are only assigned a senior engineer; they do not get a mentor
or do a special project. The senior engineer is an experienced engineer who they
work directly with for 2 years. A senior engineer is a regular engineer (not
management) with at least 5 years experience (since TTC hasn't been around for
very long, senior engineers in Japan have at least 8 years of experience) and only
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works with one new engineer at a time. He selects one of his parts for the new
engineer to work on. In the beginning, they might work with the new engineer
about 30% of the time. They tell the new hire what to do day to day and reviews
his/her work. They have to approve your drawings first, the section coordinator
then approves it, then the manager. Only then is the drawing released. As the
new hire gains experience, he will get more parts and depend on the senior
engineer less and less.
Ford does not have this formal day-to-day mentoring. New Ford
engineers learn by asking questions, from observations, and they learn from their
mistakes. Therefore, it's up the new engineer to "know what they don't know".
Furthermore, the Toyota process formalizes the knowledge transfer from the
experienced engineer to the inexperienced engineer.
Culture vs. Initiative
Technical depth is revered both at Toyota and in Japan. If one enters
Toyota as a brake engineer, they remain a brake engineer. Non-management
promotions are based strictly on seniority. So, there is no competition or hard
feelings. While this does foster teamwork, the interview subjects did point out
issues with promotions based solely on seniority. One person cited the example
of an engineer who would come in at 10am and leave by 3pm. Despite this
behavior, he got promoted along with everyone else. And, the subject also cited a
case where one of the sections lost their supervisor. One of the senior engineers
stepped in as acting supervisor and did a great job. However, Toyota would not
promote her at that time because she did not have the required seniority.
Most of the people we interviewed thought that ESP/TMM was a good
idea. However, they felt it was too contrived and they were skeptical that Ford
would succeed in this project. For example, one person stated that 'since it's on
paper, it puts too much power in the hands of people who can hurt you'. She
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went on to say that she thought it could be used like APELS (quizzes intended to
determine your knowledge on a certain engineering subject), to be used against
people who don't have their box checked (had not passed a certain number of
these quizzes). She said that at Toyota, it's not as formal. That is, tasks related
to technical development are an actual part of the culture of Toyota. It is simply
what they do - what they have to do as a part of their day-to-day job. She said
that Toyota uses tools to develop you, not punish you. For example, their
performance review form consisted of 2 pages and 8 categories where you were
ranked 1-4. Ford's forms are far more complicated. Similar to Ford, they do lay
out objectives, and they are judged on whether or not they meet these objectives.
The difference seems to be that Toyota uses these assessments to determine
development plans. Ford will also judge your performance on your objectives.
However, they will also assess an engineer's performance on several company
objectives - many of which determine whether or not an engineer has completed
some task (checked the box), i.e. have you passed at least 5 APELS. In order to
stress their importance, the completion of these tasks is often required for one to
get a promotion or receive the highest performance rating at Ford.
Ultimately, the test of whether the ESP/TMM project at Ford will truly
be a culture change rather than a failed initiative lies in the hands of management,
not the rank and file. Management must show that they value technical depth by
their actions. They must reward and recognize technical depth, not just go
through the motions as prescribed by the new process. If they do not
demonstrate and communicate the value in completing the Individual Training
and Development Plans (ITDP's) and other tasks related to the ESP/TMM
project, engineers will just see these tasks as new box checking exercises.
Workload and Organizational Structure
All of the interview subjects pointed out that the scope of an engineer's
responsibilities is very different between Toyota and Ford. Toyota eschews
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digital data. They prefer hand sketches to illustrate issues and discuss causal
mechanisms. They feel that if you can draw your part, then you really know your
part. When they do get to doing to CAD work, the engineer does the CAD
work. Again, they must draw the part to know the part. Toyota also does not
have a separate Vehicle Engineering Organization as Ford does. The D&R
engineer is responsible for testing and delivering all attributes related to his/her
part. They are the experts and owners of their parts. Now, to facilitate these
extra responsibilities, they have fewer parts and don't work on business issues
such as cost, purchasing, ordering parts etc. Furthermore, Toyota's use of parts
commonization also reduces workload. All of these factors help create slack in
the organization that allows Toyota engineers to focus on the engineering aspects
and be the technical experts for their parts.
Lessons Learned and Potential Actions
From these interviews, there are three lessons learned that might be
translated into action at Ford Motor Company. First, we could adopt the process
of formally assigning FCG's to work directly with more experienced engineers.
Some supervisors already select one of their engineers for which the FCG to
work with. But, this practice is informal and optional. Ideally, these more
experienced engineers would be the Ford Senior Engineers; however, there are
not enough to mentor the FCG's throughout their rotations. Therefore, a list of
qualifications would need to be developed for which engineers could act as a
senior engineer.
Second, we can learn from the fact that the development of technical
depth is just a way of doing business at Toyota. Now, technical depth is not an
issue for Toyota of Japan because technical knowledge is revered in Japan and at
Toyota; while most Americans and Ford employees respect power more than
knowledge. However, TTC in the United States is experiencing some problems
establishing a clear technical career path. Apparently, there is a joke that TTC
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stands for 'Toyota Training Center' as many of their employees work there for a
few years and then go to work for Ford. The lesson that we can apply here is
that all aspects of our initiative must be tied back to the delivery of day-to-day
work. That way, the initiative will become a part of 'the way we do business
around here'. However, we can see from TTC that even when technical depth is
ingrained in the corporate culture, promoting a technical career path is still not a
trivial task.
Only one of the people that we interviewed had been at TTC recently
enough to still have contacts there. It was this contact that reinforced that TTC
still had not established a clear technical career path. So, we don't know enough
about the details to understand exactly what the issues are that lead many of these
engineers to leave TTC after a few years. We can speculate that if a clear
technical path is not evident, then employees will still not feel satisfied to remain
a senior engineer at TTC for the rest of their career. All of the people we
interviewed said that they are happier working at Ford. One said that although
Ford had its problems, it is always an exciting place to work. He said that things
went so well at Toyota, it could be boring at times. For the people that we
interviewed, Ford fulfills something that Toyota was not providing - a higher
position, more excitement, more money, or the opportunity to work for an
American company.
Finally, all of these lessons learned around workload and organizational
structures are intriguing. Toyota makes its engineers responsible for their parts
from CAD to the delivery of attributes. In order to make this possible, the
engineers have fewer parts and do not have to deal with issues pertaining to cost,
purchasing, ordering parts, etc. For many Ford engineers, this would be a dream
come true. If asked, most of them would say that they spend about 80% of their
time doing administrative work and only about 20% of their time actually
working on engineering issues. Furthermore, Toyota's extensive commonization
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of parts enables this reduced workload. They don't have to redesign and retest so
many parts.
Note that there are some strategic reasons why some of these changes
would be more difficult to implement at Ford. For example, Toyota customers
usually purchase their vehicles based on history of quality, while Ford customers
purchase their vehicles based on price and styling. The extreme cost pressures
have become a large part of a Ford engineer's job. And, the constraints of styling
often preclude commonization.
Out of these potential course corrections, the one that most likely to be
executed successfully is to ensure that all aspects of the initiative are tied back to
the delivery of day-to-day work. Thus, the initiative will become a part of 'the
way we do business around here'. This is actionable and within the scope of this
project. The lessons learned around senior engineers as mentors and




PRESENTATION OF ESP SURVEY DATA
Research Methods
Now that the ESP/TMM project had been developed and was being
disseminated across the company, the HR team responsible for obtaining
feedback on the ESP project and its roll out laid out a clear plan to collect both
quantitative data via online surveys as well as qualitative data via focus groups.
This data was reported to upper management as a status of the project as well as
used for course corrections for continuous improvement. The first roll out of
the ESP/TMM project occurred with select body engineering departments. The
first online survey occurred in August of 2002 and solicited input from all of the
people who participated in this pilot - 128 employees including GSR's (general
salary role engineers), supervisors, and managers. 62 people took the online
survey. Upon completion of the roll out of the ESP/TMM project to the entire
Body Engineering Organization, a second survey was conducted in December of
2002. Again, all employees who had participated in ESP/TMM training were
invited to take the online survey. About 854 people received this survey. There
were 330 respondents, again made up of GSR's, supervisors, and managers.
The most recent online survey took place in July to August 2003 and
occurred in the midst of the roll out of the ESP/TMM project to the Powertrain
and Chassis Organizations. All of the people in the Body, Chassis, and
Powertrain organizations were invited to take the online survey, 1670 people.
Note that all of the people in the Chassis and Powertrain organizations had not
yet gone through the ESP/TMM training. Thus, 686 people took the online
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survey this year. By the end of 2003, the entire Chassis and Powertrain
organizations will have gone through the ESP/TMM training. Consequently,
there is another online survey planned for January of 2004 to capture the
feedback of the organizations as a whole. Also note that the August 2002 survey
of the Body Engineering pilot was done primarily to get quick feedback and
course corrections in preparation for the roll out to the larger Body Engineering
community. For our analysis here, we will only discuss the results from the
December 2002 survey of the entire Body Engineering Organization and the
August 2003 survey of the Chassis, Powertrain, and Body Organizations.
Focus groups also coincided with these online surveys. The groups were
segregated by the following delineations: [1] FCG's (Ford College Graduates,
those with 2 yrs or less experience), [2] GSR's, [3] supervisors, and [4]
managers/chief engineers from all participating functions. In 2003, they added
another group - Senior Engineers. For each group, 30 people were randomly
selected from their respective population and received an invitation to participate
in the focus group. In 2003, only 3-4 people showed up to each focus group
session. We contribute this to people being very busy as well as due to the fact
that lots of people take vacations in August. However small the participation, we
were still able obtain good qualitative information from the people that did
attend. For our analysis, we will mainly refer to the 2003 focus group results as
we were directly involved and conducted the discussions with the GSR's,
supervisors, and Senior Engineers from Body Engineering.
December 2002 ESP Survey
The survey participants in 2002 were all members of the Body
organization. This is a result of the body organization roling out the ESP/TMM
program in advance of the other organizations to select Body Departments. A
total of 330 people participated in the on-line survey. Of the respondents, 74%
identified themselves as General Salary Role personnel or engineers, as we have
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been referring to them in this document. First level supervisors (LL6) made up
21% of demographics while the remaining 5% were managers (LL5) or above.
This is a fairly good mix of respondents and should be a reasonable
representation of the workforce as a whole. However, with only 15 managers
responding to the survey, their responses should only be used directionally.
The survey participants also had a varied background with their
experience at Ford. Nearly 4 0% of the respondents had been with the company
5 years or less. This would mean that they had lived their entire professional
career after the reorganization to Ford 2000. They had never experienced the
function-based organization. In addition, the recent major reorganization would
have been the first major reorganization that they had been through. Most of the
remaining respondents (46%) had between 6 and 15 years of experience with the
company and the remaining 14% had been with Ford for more than 16 years.
There was a good mix of participation throughout the body organization
both by function and by vehicle cluster. Nearly all of the respondents identified
themselves as belonging to body structures, closures, exterior systems, interior
systems, safety, and seats and restraints. The respondents were spread fairly
evenly throughout these groups. It is important to note that body structures has
been identified as a core commodity; and therefore, most of the engineering
within this functional group is done inside of Ford. The remaining functional
groups primarily have the detailed engineering work performed by full service
suppliers. The survey was taken at a time when there was some shuffling of
responsibilities from one vehicle cluster to another. In addition, a new functional
group called North American Engineering (NAE) was being formed to
incorporate seats, restraints and safety personnel. The survey happened to occur
when the company in this transition. Even so, the respondents identified
themselves as being spread out among the 4 vehicle clusters in North America
and Lincoln (which has since been absorbed by the 4 vehicle clusters). The sport
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utility and truck vehicle centers accounted for 47% of the respondents, while
Lincoln and the two car clusters accounted for 48%.
The respondents to the first survey seem to reflect the entire sample
from which they were taken. The survey participants and thus their position,
experience, function and local organization in which they work were collectively a
good representation of the Body Engineering Organization as a whole. In
situations where there were not enough respondents to be statistically significant,
we will only use the responses as general trends. The detailed demographics and
raw data for this survey appear at the end of this paper as Appendices B-H.
August 2003 ESP Survey
Another survey was taken in August of 2003. The number of
participants grew to 485. Between December 2002 and this survey, the
ESP/TMM training had spread throughout the body organization and had been
rolled out to chassis organization. The two surveys provide some milestones to
gauge the effectiveness of the roll out of the program as it progresses through the
company and how the initiative is taking hold in the Body organization.
The demographics of salary position closely resemble the previous
survey. Seven out of ten respondents were part of the GSR position or at the
working level engineer. Of all of the people who participated in the survey, 27%
identified themselves as first-level supervisors. The remaining three percent were
at a manager level or higher. This mix of people is a good representation of the
workforce in general. As with the previous survey, the response of the
managerial workforce needs to be treated directionally because there were only 15
responses.
The responses to this survey in the area of work experience show that
the respondents had more experience as a whole than in the previous survey.
The percentage of respondents that had less than 5 years with the company
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dropped from nearly 4 0% to 2 8% in this survey. The respondents that had
between 6 and 10 years of experience remained nearly constant at 26%. The
remaining 46% had greater than 11 years with the company. This increase in
relative experience could be reflective of the sample size of the first survey, but
could also be a result of a strict hiring restriction policy in the company over the
past year. The percentage of new hires taking the survey dropped from 4 % to
1%. It is also not known what percentage of the personnel taking the first survey
were in their fourth and fifth years with the company at the time of the first
survey (as they would now be in the 6-10 year category one year later).
About 6 4% of the survey participants identified themselves as most
closely related to the body organization. The 310 respondents in this survey will
be compared to the 330 who responded to the last survey. Most (3 2 %) of the
remaining participants identified themselves with the chassis function. This is the
first time this functional group has responded to a survey. Part of the focus of
the analysis of these surveys is to compare the responses of organizations within
Ford that have had the program in place for a over a year to those who had just
had the ESP/TMM introduced to them in the past few months.
The roll out of the NAE organization since the end of 2002 to the
beginning of 2003 makes it difficult to compare the responses of the different
vehicle clusters. In fact, the NAE functional organization that is responsible for
seats, restraints, and safety represents nearly 41% of the respondents. However,
the NAE respondents are almost all part of the old body organization and this
will be factored into our analysis. In addition, the vehicle clusters have been
reorganized slightly since the December 2002 survey. Unfortunately, further
details on functional groups within each functional organization become more
and more difficult to identify as the respondents become more widespread. This
type of comparison will not be possible for this survey as the data is not available.
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The detailed demographics and raw data for this survey appear at the end of this
paper as Appendices I-M.
Focus Groups
In addition to the survey, focus groups of some key groups were held to
get more personal and specific qualitative responses. The focus groups that will
be analyzed for this research are all within the body organization. Separate
sessions were held with GSR engineers, senior engineers, and first level
supervisors. Participation in these focus groups did not constitute a large
percentage of the total participation (the sessions averaged 4 people per group),
but were used to gauge the overall "pulse" within the company and to probe
deeper into the some of the issues of corporate culture.
As with the previous survey held in December 2002, the responses to
this August 2003 survey represent a good cross section of the population that it
was sampled from. Nearly 41% of the possible population responded to the
survey. Reinforced by the responses of the focus groups, we feel confident that
the survey results will provide insight into the how the organization is receiving
the new organization and, more particularly, the ESP/TMM program
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Chapter 7
ANALYSIS OF ESP SURVEY DATA
Why Change?
In order for a new program to work, perhaps the most important
ingredient is for the people within the organization to recognize the need for the
program and understand its importance. Both surveys reveal that this need is
indeed overwhelmingly recognized by the organization. With a favorable
response defined as either agreement or strong agreement, 97% of the December
2002 and 9 6% of the August 2003 respondents understood the need for technical
maturity and engineering excellence within the product development
organization. While this indicates potential openness to adopting a technical
organization that stresses further technical development, it also hints at how
much technical expertise has probably been lost by the company. This is
reinforced by the discussions with the focus groups. Many participants expressed
frustration with how much expertise had been lost over the past 5 to 7 years
whether it is due to attrition or engineers changing responsibilities before
expertise can be developed. Another common complaint was the lack of
knowing where or who to turn to for technical help when problems arose. Thus,
the lack of technical depth within the company appears not just to be the fear of
upper level management, but is also felt deep within the organization by the
working level engineer and middle management.
Is the Company Doing What it is Saying?
The second major issue to consider is the message that is being sent out
from upper and lower level management. This was investigated with two
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questions in the survey: "What are you told is more important - being a generalist
or being technically deep?" and, "What do you believe is more valued by the
organization - being a generalist or being technically deep?" The verbal message
appears to be quite clear: the company sees being technically deep as more
important. Nearly 90% of the respondents in both surveys felt that they were
being told that being technically deep is more important than being a generalist.
This is a positive sign that the message is getting out to the employees. The
response, in no doubt, was reinforced by the fact that a majority of the
respondents had undergone training for the Technical Maturity Model (TMM).
In addition, the roll out of the reorganization was less than two years old at the
time of the August 2003 survey. Accompanying this roll out were many
employee off sites and "all-hands" meetings that described the reasoning behind
this reorganization. The lack of technical depth and frequent employee
movement from job to job were both cited as the major impetus for the
reorganization. It is not surprising that the response is so lopsided to this
question.
However, the response to what the participant's felt the company really
believes is important was different. About 6 0% of the respondents in the first
survey and 6 5 % of the respondents in the second survey believed that the
company really valued being technically deep over being a generalist. It is
important to remember that a vast majority of the respondents had been through
the TMM/ESP training before taking this survey. This may tend to influence
their response as being inclined to think that the company believes that being
technically deep is more important. As expected, the company has a way to go to
demonstrate that this new organization and, more importantly, the new culture of
spending eight to ten years within a single functional position is going to be the
way it will operate in the future. Recalling lessons from the literature review,
Larkin stressed that the company communicate by stating facts, not catch
phrases. Furthermore, Larking reminds that face-to-face two-way discussion is
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the most effective way to communicate a culture changing initiative. We discuss
ways to improve the communication of facts in the chapter on Conclusions and
Recommendations. However, based on the survey, the company is on the right
track. Company culture is not created overnight. In a company that is as massive
and has as much history as Ford Motor Company, any sort of cultural change will
take several years even if it were done perfectly. In addition, trying to implement
a program of technical depth that takes years to acquire in the automotive
industry will also take years for the company and the employees to see the results.
Looking over the verbatim responses from the survey and the factoring
in the focus groups, we think the numbers are a little misleading. Several people
expressed frustration that the "old" method of switching jobs every couple of
years or so was still being rewarded. In addition, as described above, many of the
sub-organizations within Ford have undergone additional restructuring and
reorganizations since the initial rollout. Due to the financial situation within the
company, some additional salaried employees and many contract employees have
been let go. All of this additional change in the organization creates short-term
turmoil and will temporarily challenge the belief in any new program. Along with
the above factors, many of the respondents to the survey as well as focus group
participants expressed the common fear with any new program that it may be the
"flavor of the month." What was somewhat alarming is that many respondents
felt that their supervisors and managers felt the same way and were delaying the
roll out of the new organization and/or the ESP/TMM model to their
organization until they saw that it was going to succeed. With all of these factors
are taken into consideration, the positive response to this question is somewhat
surprising.
What's in it for Me?
The first survey also had some questions that tried to evaluate the
effectiveness of the organizational rollout. One question that went right to the
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heart of the matter was whether or not a person's technical expertise was
considered during the reorganization. The answer was nearly divided equally in
thirds between those who responded favorably, neutrally or unfavorably to this
question. This points out an important opportunity missed by upper level
management at Ford. If the individuals within the organization feel like their
needs are personally being addressed during reorganization, the chance that they
will support the change increases dramatically. In Paul Strebel's Harvard Business
Review article, "Why Do Employees Resist Change?" he suggest that managers
put themselves in their employees' shoes to understand how change looks from
that perspective and to examine the terms of the "personal compacts" between
employees and the company. Personal compacts are reciprocal obligations and
mutual commitments, both stated and implied that define the relationship
between employees and organizations. Unless managers define new terms and
persuade employees to accept them, it is unrealistic for managers to expect
employees to fully buy into changes that alter the status quo.
Furthermore, if the company had taken into consideration the new
culture they were trying to create and the ESP/TMM model before beginning the
reorganization, they would have been in a better position to appeal to the
individuals from this cultural level. Instead, it appears that a majority of the
respondents felt that the new organization was set up as a framework with the
employees simply plugged in to place. Even if the technical depth could not be
considered in some cases for an employee, if this fact was openly recognized by
the company, Ford would have been better off to do so. This was reinforced by
the verbatim responses from the second survey and the focus groups.
Many employees felt that they were simply stuck in a certain location
when the reorganization occurred and there they are being told to remain.
Because of the culture of constantly switching jobs into new functional areas,
many employees were not in the functional area of the majority of their training a
deepest expertise at the time of the reorganization. In many cases, these
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employees remained in the same functional area both before and after the
reorganization. This left some of the workforce feeling as if their past
experiences were completely discounted by the company and left them skeptical
about the company believing that their technical expertise would be important to
its future. In many cases, the employees were correct. Ford made the difficult
choice of trying to reorganize while protecting the programs that were currently
under development. This meant that there was little shuffling of personnel into
their areas of expertise. There was also not a mechanism in place to do a deep
dive assessment of the company's technical proficiency down to an individual
engineer level. These issues underscore how difficult it is to rebuild an
organization that still has near term responsibilities to its shareholders and has
been focused in a single direction for such a long period of time that all of the
metrics developed only support this direction.
Do the Employees Understand the ESP/TMM Concepts?
Since the overall need and company belief that a change to a more
technical organization appears to be required, the next thing to be investigated is
the overall understanding to the ESP/TMM model needs to be evaluated. In the
first survey, 89% responded that they understood the concepts and principles
underlying ESP/TMM while this number decreased to 84% in the second survey.
It is important to note again that most of the respondents had undergone off-site
training in ESP/TMM prior to taking the survey so it is expected that the
response to this question would be quite positive. In fact, in the second survey,
only 64% of the people who did not take the training stated that they felt they
understood its concepts and underlying principles. Within the Body organization,
the percentage that thought they understood this concepts and principles
remained fairly constant between the two surveys. This seems to indicate that the
ESP/TMM model training had remained with the employees over the past year.
Again, these results indicate that the company is on the right track with the
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rollout of this program. The employees that have undergone the training seem to
understand what is purpose is and the reasoning behind its implementation.
The next set of responses that will be analyzed deal with the ESP/TMM
training and model in particular. In response to the whether they felt that the
ESP/TMM training was useful, only 55% felt that this was the case in first
survey. This question was not asked directly in the second survey, but the
training had undergone a lot of changes between the sessions that had occurred
since the pilot. One of the main differences is that a lot of effort was made to
make many of the details specific and relevant to the particular functional
organization that was undergoing the training. For example, upper level
management identified many of the critical skills for each position within a
functional group. This gave the engineers a chance to compare what they felt
was important with the thoughts of their management to see if they were in-line.
It also took some of the confusion out of setting up an individual technical
development plan for the engineers.
Can ESP/TMM Help Build a Technical Career Path?
The belief that the ESP/TMM is among the right tools for both creating
a technically sound organization and developing an individual's technical depth
within this organization is not as positive as the belief that a change is necessary.
Those who felt that the use of ESP/TMM would strengthen technical career
paths with product development were 7 2% and 6 5 % from the first and second
surveys respectively. The body organization response to this dropped slightly to
67% over the eight months between surveys. The responses of both engineers
and first level supervisors matched the overall response nearly identically. With a
very small sample size, higher-level managers felt that the ESP/TMM would
strengthen technical career paths within PD by over a 90% positive response in
both surveys. This is a positive indication for the reorganization and its future.
Ultimately, it is these managers that make the advancement and personal
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development decisions for they employees that work for them. This positive
response seems to indicate that they will take into account the engineer's technical
background in these decisions. There is no indication with this survey how much
the ESP/TMM or the new organization had an impact on this response, but it is
still is a good indicator for the company.
The workforce also seems a little bit more tentative on how the TMM
will impact their technical depth. Nearly 70% of the employees responded
favorably to the belief that using the TMM would enhance their technical depth
with their functional area. This number was only 60% in the second survey for
both the total population and the body organization. These results seem to
indicate that the TMM model may not be taking firm hold at the individual level
at this point. This was shown in focus groups and the individual responses to the
surveys. Many people indicated that they hadn't had time to work on the details
of the TMM and their ITDP after their initial training. In addition, in some
departments discussions on these subjects between employees and management
had not come to fruition. The most positive responses to this question came
from upper level management. The ITDP and the core values of the TMM apply
less directly to this group of employees than supervisors and engineers. This
perhaps underscores a disconnect between these two groups of employees; with
management feeling that the tools within TMM and the ITDP are more effective
than the employees who actually develop and follow these frameworks do. Ford
needs to ensure that the ITDP and TMM is not simply useful for management,
but at all levels of the company.
Will ESP/TMM Help Ford Motor Company?
The respondents were a little bit more positive about how the TMM will
work for the company as a whole. In both surveys, about 70% of the
respondents felt that the ESP/TMM project would strengthen their team's ability
to meet business needs. Again, the responses did not vary greatly by position
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within the company or by functional organization. Although there is only about a
10%  difference in favorable response rates, focus group discussions seem to
reinforce that there is a conflict going on in the eyes of some of the employees.
While an overwhelming majority of employees feel that the company needs to
become more technically deep and they also feel that the ESP/TMM project will
help the company move in this direction, fewer of the employees feel that this
change is necessarily better for them. This is an important point that Ford needs
to pay close attention to, for if this conflict grows to be significant, it is difficult to
imagine the ESP/TMM project succeeding.
From an employee satisfaction point of view, it is much harder to slow
down the process of rotating people than it is to speed it up. Employees will
respond to what is rewarded and what they feel is in their best interest. Switching
jobs every 18-24 months is probably exciting to most engineers. In addition to
learning a lot of new things, it also gives the impression that they are actively
furthering their career by changing. It is much more difficult to convince
someone that they are progressing by limiting the changes that they see. If
following the ESP/TMM project is not perceived as being in their best interest,
they would not adopt it. This also goes back to what they believe the company
feels as more valuable. If 40% of the workforce continues to feel that being a
generalist is more important to the company, these employees will continue to
strive to be generalists. Demanding that they curb this behavior without
changing this belief will only create employee discontent and the organization's
effectiveness will be diminished. Ford Motor Company is also in a difficult
situation where there aren't a lot of examples within the company that can clearly
defined as successful technical experts. There are a lot of generalists, however.
Management faces the challenge of trying to maintain high levels of employee
satisfaction through these next few years of training and experience within a
single technical function before the workforce begins to feel like they are moving
towards technical excellence. Employees may agree and even want technical
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depth. However, within the current state of Ford Motor Company, there isn't
always the proper activities or mentoring in place to immediately fulfill this desire
to obtain technical depth as quickly as possible. This interim period will be very
difficult indeed.
Communication Around Technical Depth
There are strong indications that technical depth is becoming part of the
everyday communication between upper level management and their employees.
In both surveys over 7 0% of the respondents felt that technical depth and
competence were emphasized more at the time of the survey than the previous
year. This is indeed a positive sign for the body organization as some of the
respondents were approaching two years since their initial training at the time of
the second survey. This means that technical depth, at least at a high level and
not necessarily the details of the TMM, has remained part of the message that is
understood by the employees.
As discussed in a previous section, from an individual employee's
technical development standpoint, the Individual Technical Development Plan
(ITDP) is at the heart of the TMM training. It is through this plan that the
employee assesses what skills are the most vital to perform their job and how
proficient they are with these skills. The ITDP also lays out possible next steps
to be taken to gain further proficiency in these areas. In addition, the ITDP is the
basis for discussions and comparison of assessment with both immediate and
upper level management. In both surveys about 65% of the respondents had
completed their ITDP. The response was about 8% higher for those who
identified themselves as part of the body organization as compared to chassis.
This is a positive sign that some parts of body are continuing to adopt the ITDP.
However, most of the body organization had completed the training several
months prior to the second survey. It is slightly alarming that the response rate is
not more favorable. The most common reason stated for not completing the
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ITDP was not having enough time, although several respondents did point out
that they did not see the point in using the tool since they felt the tool was either
not useful or was not going to be used in aiding in their career.
As a follow-up question, the survey participants were asked if they had
had a technical development discussion with their supervisor and manager. Here
the responses showed a remarkable improvement from the first survey to the
second survey. In the first survey, only 53% of the employees reported to having
such a discussion and this number rose to 69% in the second survey. The body
organization had similar results to the overall response of the second survey.
However, slightly more than half of the people who responded favorably to this
question felt that this discussion was better than previous technical development
discussions that they had had with their superiors. The last few responses seems
to question how firmly the ESP/TMM is taking hold as a normal way for
employees to chart and plan their technical development and their management's
use of this idea and the relevant tools in discussing technical development with
their employees. It seems to indicate that the training may not be leaving the
classroom in many cases and getting full adoption within the functional
organization. We can infer that people are just "going through the motions" to
satisfy the ESP/TMM requirements.
One of the possible reasons for this is that the use of the ITDP and the
TMM is not strictly mandated for performance reviews and other development
discussions as other tools are. For new concepts and with the magnitude of the
task that Ford is undertaking in the technical development of its employees,
perhaps a more strict adoption of these tools is required. Among the discussions
with supervisors and engineers that took place in the focus groups, many still
expressed confusion about the ITDP even after training. In Pfeffer and Sutton's
article, "Smart Talk Trap", one of the keys to overcoming the 'knowing' and the
'doing' gap is to avoid wrapping initiatives in complex language and to simply,
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simplify, simplify. The gaps can only be overcome if the right activities and
mentoring systems are in place. Instead of continually discussing 'why', the
company needs to focus on the 'how'. We discuss ways to make the ITDP an
integral way of doing regular business in the Conclusions and Recommendations
section. Supervisors were especially perplexed by what they felt was a rather
complicated and hard to work with document that made up the ITDP. In
addition, many engineers felt that the use of the ITDP was not mandatory and
was not necessarily encouraged by their management. Despite these complaints,
about 70% of the respondents remained satisfied with the technical discussions
that had with their management (those that responded that they had had some
sort of technical development discussion in the first place).
If the ITDP or equivalent technical development plan was developed, a
very high percentage (greater than 80%) responded that they were in fact
implementing their plans. This is a very positive sign that should be tracked in
future surveys. It is another indicator of the momentum that the ESP/TMM
project has within the organization. The ITDP is also at the ground level within
the organization. The use of the tool would also indicate that the type of work
and the purpose behind the work might also be shifting focus toward a technical
nature. It would be expected that this number would initially be quite high and
would remain high if the project is fully adopted by the company. However, if
interest wanes in the project, this would be a great lead indicator, as the
percentage of favorable responses would start to weaken.
Senior Engineers
Finally, the August 2003 survey included questions on the Senior
Engineer classification and Technical Specialists positions. Nearly 8 0% of the
respondents indicate that the Senor Engineer position is a step in the right
direction toward creating more opportunities for a technical career path in PD.
The focus groups with engineers, senior engineers and supervisors really
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reinforced this positive response. Discussions with these groups indicated a
number of points about the senior engineer position. There was overwhelming
approval about the individuals selected for the senior engineer classification. In
our day-to-day conversations, we don't recall hearing anyone object to any
individual that was selected for the position. This is extremely positive. One of
the keys to creating this classification of someone who is an expert in their
individual field is ensuring (especially initially) that the right people are selected
for the job. If mistakes are made in this regard, the position can lose the respect
of the workforce before it is even established in the workplace. In a worst case
scenario, the position eventually would become something that is not earned, but
rather given after an employee has invested enough time with the company.
The other, almost universal, response was that there were not enough
senior engineers to go around for the company and there were many other people
that were deserving of such a position. Through discussions with the human
resources department within Ford, the number of senior engineers chosen for the
initial election was deliberately kept to a small number. This was to ensure that
the position kept its technical integrity and to allow for the slow growth of the
total number of senior engineers. The hope is that through advancement and
attrition there will always be a few senior engineering positions available to
deserving employees. The fact that many felt that there were a number people
who deserved such a position should be taken as a positive sign for Ford. It is
essential for Ford to collect and cultivate all of the technical knowledge at their
disposal at this critical juncture for the company.
Another theme of the focus groups is that there doesn't appear to be a
detailed plan in place for the utilization of the senior engineer. Senior engineers
ultimately need to be the primary source for mentors within an informal
"apprenticeship program" that is necessary to provide the technical guidance the
workforce requires. The senior engineers reported being used quite differently.
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Some reported that they saw no difference in their day-to-day activities after
being classified as senior engineers and others reported being contacted by many
programs to aid in "fire-fighting" activities. Supervisors had similar responses.
Many admitted to not using the senior engineer position yet, and many felt that
the senior engineer should spend at least part of their time as a consultant to
other programs. The idea was to use their technical expertise to help with the
design of critical sub-system within a vehicle and to help teach other engineers.
The frustration of not having enough senior engineers in place to do this
extremely effectively at this point of time came through at this time. Hardly any
of the engineers reported having much (if any) contact and learning experiences
with the senior engineer of the appropriate functional expertise. Many even
expressed that they did not know whom this person would be or how to find
them. The apparent lack of this detailed plan should again be taken as a warning
sign to Ford. In an environment where management is concerned that there is a
tremendous lack of technical depth within the company (a belief that seems to be
held by most of the workforce as well), every effort needs to be made to
maximize what technical depth the company does have. In addition, the senior
engineer position is also symbolic of the company's change in belief that a
technical career within the company is what will be valued and rewarded. The
position must remain highly visible and accepted fully by the workforce. This
lack of clarify about this key resource in developing technical expertise is telling
data about how well the ESP process is going at Ford
Overali Observations
The overall feeling felt day-to-day at Ford, the focus groups, and the
verbatim responses from the second survey seems to be more skeptical and
negative than the survey results indicate in hard numbers. Perhaps the
respondents to the survey were more inclined to be favorable toward the project
than those who did not take the survey. The new organization is in place and this
has had an impact most of the jobs within engineering. The physical relocation
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of many of the engineers and the reorganization of these engineers into
functional groups probably has had some positive effect on the technical depth of
the workforce. Other engineers that perform the same function as themselves
are now much more easily identifiable and assessable. However, it is debatable
on how much further the technical development of these engineers has
progressed.
The overall feeling from personal responses from engineers is a great
deal of skepticism about the ESP/TMM project. Many feel that it is simply
another "box" to check for advancement up the company ranks. For the past
several years, Ford has suffered from having too many supervisors and managers
for the number of positions available. In addition, there have been a number of
qualified engineers for supervisory positions that have waited several years for
promotion. Unfortunately, the survey does not tap into this area of skepticism
and probably should in the future. As a result of the number of engineers waiting
to be promoted, the number of qualifications for these positions has informally
increased. Many engineers see the ESP project as another informal qualification
for promotion; or even worse, another roadblock to prevent promotions.
Another source of skepticism involves the usual "flavor of the month"
mentality. This prompts many of the engineers to sit back and wait to see what
will happen. They don't feel like participating in using any new tools until they
are forced to do so or it is obvious that this is a new way of doing business. This
would be true of any new program. Unfortunately, the challenging current
business climate that Ford is currently in has forced a number of smaller
reorganizations and the movement of personnel. This fuels the skepticism that
the stability of the workforce is not a main priority of the company. What is
unusual in this case, is that this skepticism seems to propagate to levels within the
upper management. Several people who participated in the focus groups
reported that their management had yet to roll out or endorse the project. This
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can create many roadblocks to the projects success. If entire departments are not
proceeding with the program and are resisting its adoption, there is little chance
that it will become part of the entire company's standard operating procedure.
Another source of concern among engineers and first level supervisors is
that the ESP/TMM project has little to do with an individual's training and
development at all. The actual functions on the job must relate to the project as
this is the "doing gap." Instead, it will be used mainly to restrict employee
movement. As discussed above, many employees felt that the reorganization was
undertaken without considering their individual skills. Many employees were not
in positions at the time of the reorganization that were not in the area of most of
their experience and training. These employees feel that their previous
experience has almost completed been discounted under the new organization.
Some engineers in our focus groups reported that fellow employees have been
told by their organization that they cannot change positions to other functional
groups since it doesn't support ESP. On the other hand, the recent smaller
reorganizations have moved several employees from areas of their interest to
different functional areas. This is something that needs to be closely monitored
by the company.
Overall, we get the sense that technical depth and development is not a
critical part of the day-to-day activities of the company. Inside of the body
organization, it appears from the comments received that the project is at a
critical junction of its implementation. The initial training was well received, but
the momentum from these invents is waning. Unfortunately, in an effort to
rollout the project to the rest of the functional organizations, many of the
company resources devoted to instituting the ESP/TMM project within Body
have been diverted to these other groups. This is an extremely fine line to walk.
On one hand, it is recognized the need and the desire for the other functional
groups to start the training and implementation of the program. However, as the
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initial adopters of the project, other organizations are looking to Body and its
progress to judge how effective the program will be. If the other organizations
see that Body is not fully utilizing the tools and principles of TMM, they will be
less likely to throw their full support and effort behind the program. In addition,
if the organization basically lets the project become ineffective it will be nearly
impossible to resurrect. Instead, a new program would have to be developed for
credibility and then it will seem like the next flavor of the month program. As
Kotter said in his article, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail",
critical mistakes in any phase can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum
and negating hard-won gains. We feel that the project is at a dangerous juncture.
The company must ensure that mistakes are corrected and do not become
critical. It is clear that the success of the ESP/TMM project within Body is vital





There is a clear recognition at all levels and positions within the
engineering community that Ford Motor Company lacks the engineering
expertise that it once had and will need to remain competitive in the automotive
industry. In addition, there is also nearly universal support for the basic concepts
and underlying principles of the ESP/TMM project. This is vital for both the
reorganization and any program that promotes the technical development of the
company's personnel to succeed.
General Observations
* 2001 Re-organization was received reasonably well, most employees
understood the reasons behind the re-org
* Still some negative feelings because people did not necessarily end up in or
were moved out of their areas of greatest expertise
* Employees and management feel that it is important for engineers to have a
technical development plan
* While employees felt that the ESP training was good, they were still confused
a few weeks later on what they were supposed to do
* Data shows that the momentum of the ESP project is stalling within Body
Engineering. People are skeptical about company's dedication to this
initiative. They are adopting a 'wait and see' attitude. Some still feel that
being a generalist is better for their career.
* The Senior Engineer position was well received, but their utilization is not
clearly defined and therefore, are not as effective as they could be
* Body Engineering is at a critical juncture right now. Other organizations are
watching to see whether the initiative succeeds or fails in Body.
Table 2. Summary of General Observations
The reorganization was received well by the company's employees in
general. There are still some significant negative feelings felt by some employees
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since many people were not currently working in their area of deepest expertise at
the time of the reorganization. While there was some reallocation of resources, it
was not significant. And in some cases, people were moved out of their area of
deepest expertise. However, most engineers feel that having a technical
development plan is important and this is reinforced by most of management.
They too, feel it is important that their employees have a technical development
plan.
Most employees received the initial ESP/TMM training favorably. The
main complaint was that some felt that the information was too complicated to
easily understand after reviewing the information a few weeks after the training
had been completed. Again, one of the lessons leamed from our literature review
is to overcome the 'knowing' and the 'doing' gap by avoiding wrapping initiatives
in complex language and to simply, simplify, simplify. Instead of continually
discussing 'why', the company needs to focus on the 'how' - how the ITDP fits
into the employees' day-to-day work. While many felt that creating a technical
development plan was important, around 40% of those surveyed had not
completed these plans several months after receiving the training. In addition,
many had not had technical development discussions with their management.
Furthermore, the momentum of the initial rollout of the ESP/TMM
project within Body Engineering appears to be stalling. Some of the resources
that were devoted to this initial rollout are being diverted to assisting in the
rollout of the project within other functional organizations. There still seems to
be some resistance even among management to the complete adoption of the
project. The continual additional reorganizations within the functional groups
send a mixed message to employees about the importance of employee stability.
At the engineering level, while the need for increased technical depth has been
clearly communicated and is generally believed, the tools provided by the
ESP/TMM project have not been emphasized enough and are not being adopted
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by a critical mass of the community. Management is tracking whether or not all
GSR engineers have completed their ITDP (Individual Technical Development
Plan) by the end of 2003. However, it currently seems to be more of 'check the
box' exercise. They just want to know whether or not you have done your ITDP.
There has been no further discussion with management on what the ITDP is
supposed to accomplish. There is also some skepticism about the company's
complete backing of the project and many feel that taking the generalist's path is
still the best decision for their career. In addition, many engineers felt it was in
their best interest to take a wait and see approach to the ESP/TMM project to
avoid investing a lot of time in something that appears to be a 'flavor of the
month' exercise.
The senior engineering position was well received by the engineering
community. The personnel selected for the senior engineering position were
generally happy with the honor and recognition bestowed upon them when they
received the designation. However, nearly all levels of management admit that
the utilization of the senior engineering position has not been executed well.
There doesn't seem to be unique roles and responsibilities in place for senior
engineers or a universal plan developed by the company to use them.
Based on the above observations, this is a critical time for the adoption
of the ESP/TMM project in Body Engineering. Since the body organization was
chosen for the pilot of the program and the initial rollout, it is vital that the
project succeeds in Body Engineering. Other organizations within Ford are
observing and investigating how the body organization is using the project and
will tend to follow Body's lead. If the project is not a success within Body, it is
unlikely to be successful elsewhere in the company. The failure of the
ESP/TMM project does not necessarily mean that the reorganization will be a
failure, but the underlying concepts and principles of the project are a sound
foundation for the rebuilding of a technical organization. If the ESP/TMM
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project were to fail, something similar would have to be developed to take its
place at an extremely high cost in both physical and human resources. In order
to increase the chance of success, the following section presents several actions
the company should take.
Recommendations for Next Steps
* Communication should come from front line supervisors and managers. And,
should be communicated through actions in addition to verbally.
* Ford should avoid rewarding fire-fighting efforts as it has in the past, and find
ways to reward and recognize technical depth. Promotions should be made
due to technical depth and these reasons need to be communicated.
* The ITDP should be mandatory (maybe replace LDEP paperwork) and
become a part of PR discussions. Supervisors and managers should use the
ITDP to support staffing and promotion decisions. Ford should resist the urge
to create metrics requiring certain levels of proficiency in each department.
This would encourage inflation of assessments for political reasons and
would turn the ITDP into a box checking exercise.
* ESP/TMM should not be used to prevent the movement of people to areas
where they would be more effective or comfortable. However, through
ESP/TMM, the employee must understand what this move might mean to
their career (possible delay of promotion).
* Ford should maximize the leverage of existing technical depth by focusing
senior engineers up front in programs - where critical decisions are made,
and at key technical milestones.
* The best metrics to measure impact of this initiative are all long term:
improvements in program performance in cost, timing, issues generated,
warranty, quality, and recalls. Since seeing these results will take years, we
also recommend some short term metrics: the use of the ITDP, survey of the
adoption of ESP/TMM initiative, and employee satisfaction.
* Ford could also look to outside resources for more research/help on growing
technical organizations.
Table 3. Summary of Recommendations
Recommendations for Next Steps:
Communication
As with nearly any organizational concern, clear communication is a key
to success. The ESP/TMM project is no exception. Ford has instituted a
monthly communication of key points about ESP that gets e-mailed to all
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personnel within product development. While this is a great idea, the real key for
the adoption of the project is closer to the grass roots level and needs to be built
into all the engineering work done throughout the company. The significance to
the company's success of the ESP/TMM project that has been communicated at
the highest level of management needs to be echoed strongly at the first level
supervisor and manager level. The real key is to make TMM principles 'the way
we do business,' like it is at Toyota. With the years of neglect and few examples
for engineers to follow, the principles must be overtly stated and reinforced
continuously. It will take years for the idea of being technically proficient to
become secondhand and the new culture to take firm hold within the company.
At that point in time, deliberate communication will become less important as
young engineers will be surrounded by more experienced personnel that will
provide "hands on" examples to follow. The technical development of
employees will be ingrained into the company culture and very little effort will
need to be expended to maintain it. Clearly, Ford Motor Company is not close to
this point at this time. Communication needs to deliberate and emanate from all
levels. It is very important that higher levels of management stress this necessity
to their employees and the message gets passed down the chain in regular day-to-
day discussions as well as through their actions.
In order to be effective, the communication cannot be limited to the
ESP/TMM project alone. Instead, the goal should be to make technical
proficiency a way of life. Most communication from upper level management is
careful to include the business details of engineering challenges and successes.
This must be expanded to also include some of the technical aspects of the
problem. It must be stressed that Ford is a technical company that is able to
develop better solutions than their competitors because of their technical depth.
In other words, it needs to be made clear that technical proficiency is one of the
most important resources that the company possesses. This goes to the heart of
all communications. New values need to be stressed, new types of heroes need
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to be discussed, and different projects and actions should be celebrated all in-line
with the new culture.
Reward and Recognition
In addition to communication, special care needs to be taken so that the
proper behavior is encouraged and recognized. Over the past decade, the
technical aspect of the solution to engineering problems was often overlooked.
Recently, efforts have been made to change this. They need to be continued and
intensified. Special attention should be given to encouraging problem prevention
versus fire fighting. If an engineer completes all of her technical milestones for a
program on time and passes all of the design verifications for her parts the first
time, this needs to be encouraged more strongly than rewarding a quick fix to a
part which fails during validation. The key is to get the mindset of avoiding
problems from ever occurring as being as highly valued as solving problems that
do occur. Communication plays a large part in this area as well. Several
departments have established an "Outstanding Technical Achievement Award."
This is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough.
Management needs to recognize and stress behavior that needs to be
followed. With Ford's current situation, it is the small details that need to be
recognized as much as larger picture. For example, people that have dedicated
most of their career to being technically deep in a functional area should be
recognized to their coworkers. This is the type of behavior that the company
wants to be the standard. When making personnel decisions, an employee's
technical expertise should be highlighted as a chief reason for their promotion in
personnel announcements. Understandably, these first two recommendations
sound very generic and straightforward. However, they are also the most crucial.
The focus groups reveal that some of the biggest obstacles for the incorporation
of the ESP/TMM project can be virtually eliminated with special attention paid
to communication and development and reinforcement of proper behavior.
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Since we feel that the lack of technical depth within the company is one of the
largest problems facing the company, the attention to details is well worth the
resources expended to make it happen.
The Role of the Individual Training and Development Plan
At the heart of the Technical Maturity Model from the individual
engineer's perspective is the Individual Technical Development Plan (ITDP).
Within the Body Engineering, at least, a significant portion of the engineering
population had yet to complete their initial ITDP. In addition, the focus groups
revealed that some departments were still resisting the rollout of the project. This
is obviously very detrimental to the success of the project. The ITDP process
must become mandatory. It is essential that the engineers complete their ITDP
and through consultations with their local management and further training and
career development, the document should become a living document.
Additionally, supervisors and managers should use the ITDP to support staffing
decisions and promotions. Ensuring that the process is followed within Ford
culture is relatively straightforward. In the short term, it needs to be added as a
line item on the performance reviews of all members within engineering. At the
engineer level, the requirement would be to (after initially completing) have an
annual update of their ITDP and have quarterly discussions around their
development plan with their supervisor and manager. The time for these
discussions can also coincide with the midterm and end of the year performance
reviews that are already in place. The ITDP can be an aid in looking to the future
as the performance review evaluates the past. The initial "forcing" of the
adoption the ITDP also highlights that the document will be around for a while.
In addition, staffing decisions must be clearly linked to the ITDP's of the
department. This direct linkage will also reinforce the importance of the
document. It is important to understand that our recommendation is that the
completion of the ITDP and discussion with the management should be a part of
the performance review, obtaining certain levels of proficiency should not be tied
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to this process. Putting demands of proficiency ratings for departments or
individuals would encourage inflation of assessments for political reasons within
the organization. The ITDP would quickly become a "box-checking" exercise
that would lose most of its effectiveness. The original intent of the ITDP was to
be a personal file that aids in the technical development and dialogue of an
engineer and her management. All efforts should be made to preserve this
original intent.
With the ITDP process in place, some steps should be made to make
the completion process easier on the engineers and their management. The initial
part of the ITDP document is to list the genetic skills that are recognized in the
product development organization. These skills are placed against the roles and
responsibilities for each individual engineer. The importance of the skills for
each role and responsibility are ranked and the top skills for any particular
position are identified. Some of the other functional groups have taken the
extremely helpful step of identifying the skills that they feel are vital for given
position within their organization. This sends the message to the engineers what
management is looking for in a technical employee. If an engineer is confused or
disagrees with some of these assessments, it provides an excellent point of
discussion during the ITDP reviews. This practice needs to be adopted by the
Body Engineering immediately. The process should not be very difficult. With a
little over 60% of the body organization having completed their ITDP, this initial
step of the process could be made anonymous and used by a small committee
(with both engineering and management representation) to develop a generic
ITDP for the limited number of positions within each department. In this way,
the roles and responsibilities and vital skills for each position will become more
straightforward and engineers can work to be on the same page as their
management. The generic ITDP should remain a living documented and
updated to meet the changing demands and technical depth of the workforce.
72
The next step of the ITDP process is to rate the individual's proficiency
against the 4-5 key skills identified in the previous step. This is compared to the
long-term proficiency level that the engineer feels is necessary to have technical
depth within their function. Management should add their expectation of
proficiency level to the generic ITDP. The reasons mirror the ones mentioned
above. As part of the final step of the ITDP, the engineer puts together a plan to
help increase their proficiency level. Body Engineering should provide a list of
possible actions that an engineer could take that might improve their proficiency
levels. While the engineer and his management would have the opportunity to
suggest other appropriate methods that do not appear on this list, suggesting
actions would be another method of communicating preferred behaviors
throughout the organization.
In the short term, additional refresher sessions (a half hour or hour in
length) should be given to both engineers and management (separate sessions) to
reinforce the ITDP process. Several supervisors in focus groups and in private
conversations asked for additional materials that stripped down the ITDP
process to its basic steps and principles. This material should be generated and
could be used as a guide for the refresher courses. The sessions would not have
to be a permanent fixture in the Ford culture. As the ITDP process becomes a
way of doing business, the refresher courses should not be necessary. Of course,
training sessions for the ESP/TMM project will need to continue for new hires
into the company and for engineers who get promoted up the management
chain.
Finally, the use of the Ford intranet in conjunction with the ITDP
should be utilized more completely. The generic ITDP for each position with in
the functional group should be posted on-line (the ESP/TMM project have
already established a very comprehensive website). We would also recommend
that the individual ITDP for each engineer also be confidentially created,
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maintained and stored on-line. This should make it easier to keep the ITDP up-
to-date and in-line with the latest generic ITDP. It will also make it easier to
manage for the supervisor and manager. In addition, as metrics for tracking the
progress of the technical maturity of a department, some of the data and self-
assessments can be used to anonymously provide status of different departments.
Managing Movement of Employees
There is still some opportunity to respond to some of the complaints
that the company did not take into account a person's technical depth at the time
of the reorganization. Instead, the company kept people mostly in similar areas
where they were currently working when the reorganization was announced.
There were some exceptions to this, but Ford was also trying to prevent major
disruptions to products that were already under development. Many engineers
still feel like they are trapped in their current position and some have been told by
management that they can not move to different positions since it would violate
the ESP. It needs to be recognized that not everyone can be accommodated.
After all of the upheavals of the recent reorganization, the company cannot
afford to have a lot of people changing positions yet again. Ford Motor
Company still has the responsibility to ensure that all functions are adequately
staffed to meet its commitments to its customers and shareholders. However,
the ESP should not be used as a method to prevent people from moving to areas
of the company where they would feel more comfortable. Ford should be
striving to eventually place their personnel where they will be the most content
and effective. Instead, management should use the TMM as a tool to help in this
area. If a position is open and his current position can be back-filled, the person
should be provided the opportunity to switch. It does need to be explained to
the engineer that this will have some impact on their career. They would need to
complete a different ITDP in their new position and perhaps not all of their prior
experience would be applicable. Frequently changing positions into different
functional areas will delay the opportunities for promotion (in other words, the
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exact opposite of the behavior that was rewarded in the nineties and early this
decade).
Special management attention has to be given to remove the stigma of
people who want to remain in engineering, but don't have a desire to move up
the management chain. Creating the senior engineering position in combination
with technical specialist positions (that are equivalent to first level supervisor
position) are steps in the right direction. However, realistically, there will never
be enough of these positions available to satisfy the technical community within
the company. At Toyota, we have learned that an engineer that has dedicated
significant time and effort to the company is celebrated regardless of where they
end up on the management chain. At Ford, there is a negative stigma attached to
someone who does not change jobs within the company frequently or doesn't
strive for management positions. This is not part of the culture that Ford is now
trying to create. Engineers should be rewarded and recognized for providing
dedicated service in a single technical area. The rewards don't necessarily have to
be promotions. Currently, Ford offers token awards at certain milestones of
service (five years, ten years, etc) to the company. Perhaps these awards could be
extended to recognize years of dedicated service to a particular function. It might
also make sense to create a couple of levels of engineering based on technical
competence. Other companies denote "A" and "B" level engineers based on
their experience. This designation can simply be a title and doesn't have to be
linked to salary grade. It would simply be another reinforcement of the desired
behavior.
Distribution of the Engineering Workforce
Restoring and rebuilding the technical proficiency of the company will
not happen quickly. Everyone in the company seems to realize this. One of the
challenges of the automotive industry is its relatively slow "clock speed." Most
people who we discussed the topic with agreed that it takes at least two product
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development cycles for an engineer to start to be proficient at his job. This
allows for the initial learning process to occur and provides the opportunity to
practice what was learned the first time around. Hopefully, during the third and
fourth product development cycles the engineer is refining his skills and working
on becoming an expert. In the automotive industry, product development
programs typically last around four years which would put technical proficiency
for an engineer within Ford to take somewhere between 7 and 9 years. In a
company that recognizes that they don't have a lot of technical expertise, the
timeframe before seeing results is several years into the future. While
management recognizes this, there still should be an emphasis on seeing results as
quickly as possible. The best way to do this is to maximize the leverage of the
existing technical depth. The current senior engineers and technical specialists
represent this resource.
Utilization of the Senior Engineer
The key to maximizing the impact of the senior engineering community
is where and how they are utilized. This is not a trivial matter. Ford is at a critical
juncture where a lot of their technical depth has been stripped away. As
discussed above, rebuilding this depth will be a difficult process. Senior engineers
must be in places where they have the best opportunity to not only affect the
bottom line of the company, but also share their knowledge with the rest of the
engineering community.
The two areas of the product development process where the senior
engineers can have the largest impact is during initial product design and at
technical checkpoints. Many of the warranty concerns and late, expensive
changes can be linked to decisions that were made very early on in the program.
Compromises were often made without adequate information on the impact of
these decisions. Senior engineers need to be very involved and their efforts
concentrated in these early stages. Ford used to maintain an initial or advanced
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program development group. Through the reorganizations over the past several
years, the size and importance of this group has been reduced dramatically. We
would recommend reforming this organization and have it populated with
experienced personnel. Every significant program should start in this
organization and the major compromises that are made should be carefully
documented. The experience personnel in this organization will quickly hone
their skills working alongside senior engineers from all functions. The impact will
be to have programs built on strong foundations and the senior engineering
community reaching a critical mass as quickly as possible.
Another area where the senior engineers and technical specialists should
be utilized is as consultants especially during key technical milestones in a
program. One of the requirements for passing through certain product
development gateways should be that this consultation has taken place and the
recommendations of the technical reviewers are documented. As stated in the
previous section, these consultations will be the most valuable the earlier in the
product development cycle that they occur and the more detailed they are. The
benefits of this consultation are great. First, it obviously presents a situation
where errors with the design can be fixed and robustness can be improved. The
technical community will have a chance to reexamine some of the compromises
that have been made and step in if the risks seem to be too great. The
consultation also provides a teaching situation between the experts in the
company and those with less experience. The information that is passed on
during these sessions will not only help immediately, but will provide for more
robust designs in the future.
These consultations are also an opportunity for the senior engineers and
technical specialists to gain recognition throughout the company. The personal
relationships that will be generated will be beneficial during times of technical
crisis in a program. Engineers will be familiar with some of the resources
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available to them. Even after the senior engineering community has grown to the
critical mass, the benefits of this consultation will still be reaped. It not only an
opportunity for outside opinions and different ideas to be surfaced, it will be a
way for the different vehicle clusters to share some of the best practices that they
have developed. It is one thing to develop best practices, but Ford has had
trouble (as do most large organization) diffusing these practices throughout the
company. Technical consulting and mentoring is a chance to teach these
practices in a "hands on" and extremely practical environment. Keeping the
intent of these consultations pure is the difficulty with this recommendation. The
consultations need to be formal enough to ensure that they occur, but informal
enough so that a lot of knowledge sharing takes place. The idea is for the
program teams to look forward to the reviews as an opportunity to make
improvements. If they are allowed to turn into a "checdist" exercise, they will
not be effective and will not deliver on many of the benefits listed above.
In the future, the efforts of the senior engineering community should be
focused on design processes in addition to the areas mentioned above. There are
simply not enough personnel to have this process begin immediately. While Ford
has many system requirements and specifications, they don't have many practical
design guidelines that simplify the process of designing key systems throughout
the company. The senior engineering community and Tech Clubs should be
used to develop and maintain these guidelines. The consultations mentioned
above would help ensure that they are put into practice. The design guidelines
provide a change to codify the knowledge in the company. They provide the
opportunity to virtually mentor the engineering community when face-to-face
communication is not possible. If events in the future again cause Ford Motor
Company to lose a lot of its technical knowledge, at least some of it has been
captured. In addition, new ideas and practices can be more quickly disseminated
throughout the company.
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As the senior engineering and technical specialist community reaches a
critical mass, Ford will also have the benefit of having the rest of the engineering
community developed deeper technical depth. At this point, experience and
technical depth should be spread more or less evenly throughout the company.
This will provide the maximum benefit of the senior engineering community and
put even the senior engineers in positions to maintain and develop new skills.
The only exception to this is upfront in product development. This critical time
in the company should always be staffed with the most experienced of personnel.
Drawing from our Toyota benchmarking, we could adopt the process of
formally assigning FCG's to work directly with more experienced engineers.
Some supervisors already select one of their engineers for which the FCG to
work with. But, this practice is informal and optional. Ideally, these more
experienced engineers would be the Ford Senior Engineers; however, there are
not enough to mentor the FCG's throughout their rotations. Therefore, a list of
qualifications would need to be developed for which engineers could act as a
senior engineer.
Workload and Organizational Structure
Recall the previous discussion from Chapter 5 on Toyota's workload and
organization structure. Their engineers are the experts and owners of their parts.
They are responsible for delivering all aspects of their parts - from CAD to
development of attributes. Now, to facilitate these extra responsibilities, they
have fewer parts and don't work on business issues such as cost, purchasing,
ordering parts etc. Furthermore, Toyota's use of parts commonization also
reduces workload. All of these factors help create slack in the organization that
allows Toyota engineers to focus on the engineering aspects and be the technical
experts for their parts. If Ford cannot implement more commonality, it will be in
jeopardy of not having enough 'slack' resources to sustain this technical culture in
the long term. Shifting of people/resources from ancillary jobs to design and
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release along with the responsibility would also help enable the engineers to be
the technical experts for their parts.
Metrics
The success or failure of the ESP/TMM project is difficult to judge.
Some of the metrics that should be impacted by the project are improvements in
program performance in terms of cost, timing, issues generated, warranty, quality,
and recall metrics are impacted by many other projects and factors within the
organization. However, they still should be considered the most important
metrics to verify the project's success. However, with program life cycles
approaching four years or longer and quality, warranty, and recall data not fully
understood until a vehicle has been on the road for several additional years, Ford
is several years off before they will see any impact to these fundamental metrics.
Short-term metrics to tack the projects success need to be established. The
surveys and the ITDP are excellent starts to developing some of the metrics. The
surveys track the adoption of the project and indicate employee satisfaction and
impact the project is having on their day-to-day activities. The ITDP, especially if
it was stored on line and individual data was available to the human resources
department anonymously could provide an overall assessment of how technical
depth is growing in the company. It also could point to key areas where
additional training is most sorely needed. Remember, the ITDP should be
reviewed for each individual up to the managerial level. However, better metrics
are still needed to track the stability of the organization. With Ford's current
tools, they are only able to track people from a department standpoint. This is
not an effective way to measure if an engineer is performing a similar job in a
similar technical area and building up their technical depth. An engineer may
switch departments, but is still working with in the same technical area with
similar roles and responsibilities. Another situation is that an engineer may switch
jobs within a department and be performing very different tasks. Tracking solely
by department number and salary grade position misses this. We would
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recommend that the human resources department have some way to identify
what technical area the engineer is associated with and what are their
responsibilities at the most general level. The current method of tracking by
department should be discontinued since it provides almost as much misleading
information as it does helpful metrics.
Extraneous Factors
It should be noted that the lack of technical knowledge within the
company is not the only problem that is facing Ford Motor Company. As with
any large and complex organization, it is difficult to focus on one thing, as so
many different factors seem vital. The automotive industry has grown
increasingly competitive over the past few years. When this is combined with a
weak economy, Ford has had to react by cutting back in many areas. The main
reason most respondents to the survey gave to not filling out their technical
development plans to not having enough time. Ford has stretched its human
resources very thin in these times of need. There are no slack resources for
learning and innovation. Referring to Lave and Wenger's article, this is an
obstacle to periphery participation. The employees are working so much on
immediate pressing issues; there is no time for observation, learning, and
introspection. Recall from the Toyota benchmarking that they have lots of slack
built into their approach. Therefore, they can learn and change much more
easily.
The lack of technical knowledge is a major contributor to programs not
being delivered on time and rising warranty and program costs, but not the only
one. Programs are not strictly following the Ford Product Development Process
and are not necessarily held up if all gateway requirements are not met. Late
program decisions for styling and marketing reasons also impact the robustness
of designs. Ford Motor Company in its recent history has not done a good job of
sharing designs and communizing parts across different products and platforms.
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The result is that each new program unnecessarily will have most systems
designed new from the ground up. Often times, the new systems are replacing
old systems that had high levels of customer satisfaction or are transparent to the
customer. The ESP/TMM project will not be a panacea that will solve all of the
problems within the company. However, establishing, developing, and valuing
technical depth is a critical core competency that Ford needs to strengthen to
succeed in the future.
Looking outside the company, we would argue that there is a rich area of
research into technical organizations that hasn't been tapped. There is not a great
deal of work by outside researchers into what it takes to build and maintain a
technical organization. After a couple of decades where early retirements,
downsizing, and outsourcing were some of the most prominent buzzwords in the
business world, we suspect that there are quite a few organizations that find
themselves in situations similar to Ford. In addition, there are many small tech
firms and organizations that have been sold off by their parent corporations that
find their technical knowledge in the hands of a few, key individuals. Research
on how to grow these organizations into learning, highly technical ones would be
quite valuable.
Vision of the Future
If the ESP/TMM project is highly successful and technical competency
becomes a core value of the company, it is important to a have a vision of how
the organization will function. The existing organizational structure can be highly
effective. One slight change would be to have the functional supervisors be tied
to a single product platform versus being charge of certain commodities for an
entire vehicle cluster. There have been situations in the new organization where
future programs have been neglected in favor of supporting the launches of other
programs. When a section is responsible for commodities on a single program,
they can really understand its timing and get to identify with a vehicle and its
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customer. Functional managers would still be responsible for functions across
the entire vehicle cluster. This will allow the functional supervisors and engineers
to frequently interact with people who are facing the same challenges on other
products. This division of functional and product responsibilities will provide the
best mix for success.
The goal for average experience among the engineers should be around
five years. If this is met, most people in the organization have been through the
complete product development cycle for at least one program. They would be in
an ideal situation to really hone their skills and there would be plenty of avenues
in which to learn. Once this level of experience and depth is reached, there
should be some more rotation of personnel. The rotation of personnel should be
to highly relevant cross-functional positions with the specific intent of eventually
returning the engineers back to their area of core expertise. For example, a small
percentage of body structures engineers should be rotated into the safety
departments, vehicle engineering, and computer aided engineering departments.
The length of rotation could still be relatively short (one to two years) and the
focus of this cross-functional rotation should still be on body structures
engineering. As the engineer is rotated back into the body structures engineering
department, she will have a chance to practice and teach what she has learned on
this assignment. With such an experienced staff, management should be able to
pick and choose different critical competencies within each function that they
need to further develop. Each function should have a series of classes that can
be taught by the senior engineering community that will discuss the fundamentals
of the engineering principles within the function. Classes that step through
design guidelines could also be developed. Newer engineers would begin their
careers in functional areas on programs that are smaller in size and from the
middle of the program through launch. They will be mentored by more
experienced members of the engineering community. After going through these
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learning stages, they can be given the opportunity to work on large programs and
further upstream in the development process.
It will probably take at least two product development cycles for an
engineer to become proficient at a function. This proficiency level should be a
minimum requirement for a senior engineer or a functional supervisor. With the
full support of the company behind it, the technical career path will become
much stronger and will have at least a few promotional levels within the
company. Engineers should be encouraged and there should be enough rewards
and recognition on either path. If the engineer decides to pursue neither track
and is most content becoming increasingly knowledgeable in a certain functional
area, this behavior should be encouraged. Engineers should be encouraged to
find the area of the company will they think they will have the most impact and
have the highest degree of job satisfaction. They will understand, however, that
frequent moves to different functional areas will probably slow down their
opportunities for promotion. The standard of technical proficiency will become
a fairly rigid requirement.
The technical experts within the company will be highly recognized and
respected. Their skills will be used on upfront and future product development.
They will remain consultants for reviews of all programs during critical gateways
as well as helping to resolve critical program issues. In addition, a group of these
technical experts will devote some of their time to formally teaching other
engineers and codifying the knowledge of the company.
The ITDP will evolve over time to facilitate the education of the
employees. It will be used as frequently as the performance review and will have
as much impact on promotions and personnel movement. The ITDP will also be
used as a metric to track the technical depth and deficiencies in the department.
84
Ideally as designs become more standardized and robust as a result of
the technically proficient workforce and the enforcement of good design
practices, fewer engineering resources will be needed to go through the final
development phases and the launch of vehicles. Again, this is reflected in
Toyota's methods. They need fewer resources because of their commonization
strategy and they re-use robust systems again and again - changing only what the
customer directly perceives. This requires fewer engineers throughout the
process, from initial design and release as well as for testing and verification to
launch of the vehicle. Re-use reduces the need for component testing and should
produce few issues at launch since the systems will have been verified time and
time again on other programs. Thus, more resources can be focused on
developing brand new technologies to be used in the future programs. This is
truly the key to the success of the company.
Final Thoughts
The position that Ford finds itself in is obviously quite a difficult one, but
it is not unique. Many other companies during the past decade also underwent
significant cost cutting, out-sourcing, and downsizing. Ford was also not alone in
stressing product platforms and elevating the concerns of the customer and
shareholder to a driving force. We suspect that several other organizations both
inside and outside the automotive industry are experiencing similar symptoms to
the lack of technical proficiency seen at Ford at various stages and severities. It
promises to be a significant organizational issue over the next few years as
companies try to react to this problem. This organizational shift to outsourcing
technical design and encouraging employees to be generalists only took a few
years. Conversely, our literature review and research shows that shifting Ford's
organization back to a technical focus will take enormous focused efforts over
several years. Hopefully, our research not only describes the background and
symptoms of the problems, but also several ways to begin addressing the biggest
issues.
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Ford Motor Company is at a critical juncture in its history. It finds itself
in a very difficult environment competitively and economically. One of its
biggest weaknesses is that technical proficiency is lacking across most of the
company. Rebuilding this technical depth will take an incredible amount
resources, time and effort. The problem that Ford is facing is that the system is
so broken that it will take a long time before momentum behind the restoration
to begins to build. With relatively long product development cycles and even
longer product use cycles, the results to the company's bottom line are many
years off. Ford Motor Company must remain patient in this timeframe and
continue its strong support of programs like ESP/TMM. The best part about the
difficulties of changing the culture in a large, complex organization is that once a
positive one is established it will reap benefits for a long, long time.
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Toyota Benchmarking Survey Questions
1. What is the typical career path for an engineer at Toyota?
2. What is the typical career path for a manager at Toyota?
3. How does Toyota ensure that their engineers have sufficient technical
depth?
4. Are there initiatives in place to support technical depth? Or is it built into
its organizational structure and culture? Please elaborate.
5. Have you taken ESP (Experience and Stability Project) training?
6. Do you think that Ford's ESP (Experience and Stability Project) project
will help Ford develop more technically proficient engineers? Why or why
not?
7. What other actions would you suggest for Ford to support the technical
development of our engineers?
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Appendix B
SURVEY QUESTIONS FROM NOVEMBER 2002
ID Question
2797 What is your educational degree (choose the
highest that applies)?
2949 How many years have you worked at Ford?
8487 What is your Salary Grade/Leadership Level?
9120 When did you first access the FLN system?
9174 What are you told is more important
(generalist/technically deep)?
9175 What do you believe is more valued by the
organization (generalist/technically deep)?
9179 Are you currently an FCG?
9181 Of which Body function are you a part?
9186 Do you belong to a Body Tech Club?
9187 In which organization do you work?
9109 I understand the need for technical maturity and
engineering excellence within PD.
9110 I understand the concepts and principles
underlying ESP/TMM.
9114 I believe that the use of ESP/TMM will
strengthen technical career paths within PD.
9113 I believe that using the TMM will enhance my
department's overall engineering competency.
9173 I believe the ESP/TMM project will strengthen
my team's ability to meet business needs.
9111 I know how to use the TMM as a framework for
facilitating technical development.
9112 I believe that using the TMM will enhance my
technical depth with my functional area.
9170 I believe that technical depth was adequately
considered in recent reorganization decisions.
9115 I believe that the ESP/TMM training was useful.
9182 I believe that a functionally-based PDC5 will
enhance my technical development.




























of Pilot? (une-August 2002)
9169 Is technical depth/competence emphasized more Yes/No
today than it was at this time last year?
9172 Do you feel that you are able to coach or help a Yes/No
team member in their technical development?
9116 As a result of the ESP/TMM training, I have had Yes/No
a technical development discussion with my
supervisor/manager.
9117 This technical development discussion was better 1-5 Range
than previous ones.
9118 Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the 1-5 Range
discussion that I had with my
supervisor/manager
9100 As a result of the ESP/TMM training, I have Yes/No
created a technical development plan.
9105 A discussion with my supervisor/manager. Yes/No
9106 Interaction with my peers. Yes/No
9107 Through use of the TMM as a framework for Yes/No
determining appropriate technical development
activities.
9103 Through use of Ford Design Institute (FDI) Yes/No
resources.
9104 Through use of the Ford Learning Network Yes/No
(FLN) as an interface to the TMM.
9123 Through use of the FLM self-inventory data and Yes/No
resulting learning solutions.
9171 Are you implementing your ITDP (Individual Yes/No
Technical Development Plan)?
9176 Do you understand the linkage between your Yes/No
Tech Club and the TMM?
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Appendix C
DEMOGRAPHIC RESULTS FROM NOVEMBER 2002 SURVEY
Number Pet ofQUESTION Responding Total













S487. What is your Salary Grade Leadership Level?
General Salary Roll (SG I - 8)
LL 6 (MR Salary Grade 9 - 10)
LL 5 and above (Salary Grade II and above)



























QUESTION JNumber Pct of
Responding Total
9174. What are you told is more important?
Being a generalist
Being technically deep
) 175. What do you believe is more valued by the organization?
Being a generalist
Being technically deep
S179. Are you currently an FCG?
Yes
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9187. With which organization are you most closely associated?
Family Vehicle Line 45 14
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9169, Is technical depth/competence emphasizd
more today than it was at this time last year?
9172. Do you feel that you are able to coach or
help a team menber in their technical
development?
9116. As a result ofthe ESPKTMM training, Ihave
had a technical development discussion with my
superviorimanager,
9117, This technical development discussion was
better than previous ones.
9118. Overall, I am satisfied with the quality ofthe
discussion that I had with mysuperviorttmanager
9100. As a result ofthe ESP/TMM training, Ihave
created a technical development plan.
9105. A discussion with my supervisor/manager
9106. Interactions with my peers.
9107. Through use of the TMM as a framework for
determining appropriate technical development
activities.
9103 Through use ofFord Design Institute (FDI)
resources.
9104. Through use of Ford Leaming Network
(FLN) as an interface to the TMM.
9123. Through use ofthe FLN self-inventory data
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Category Percents Number
Favourable Neutral lUntbvourabl Responding Standing











































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable Q Neutral i Unfavourable Favourabk Neutral Unfavonrabi Responding Staitg
1 2 3 4 5 ]
9,117. This tecikW aldevekopment
discussion was better than previous ones.
GederI Saty RolI(SO
11 6(MR. &aoayonde 9
1I. S acd above (MSiry (rade II and c
9118. Overal. I am saidied with the
quality of the discussion that I bad with my
supavisodmanager
GteInal Satiny RoU (SO
1LEIMR-SaSyGMde49
it5 and above (Satry Grade I I and a
9100. As a result ofthe ESP/ThMM training.
[ have created a teclmical development plan.
Gaeral Satny Roll (SO
11. 6(MR - saty Gmde 9
L S adl above (Miry GtIrade and a
9105. A discussion with iny
qupervisor/manager.



























































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NuberQUESTION Favourable [ Neutral f Unavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
LL 6(MR - Sakry
LL 5 and above (Salay Crade.
9106. Interactions with my peers.
General Salay F
1L6(MR-Salwy
LL 3 and above (Salawy Grnde




LL 6 (MR -,Saiay
LL 5 ad above (Salary Grade
9103. Through use ofFor Design Instit
(FD1) reources.
Gener Salmy F
LL 6(MR - Salary
LL 5 and above (Salary Grade
Gade 9- 10) I61% 0% 39%


















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable 0 Neutral * Unlavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Rtspmnding Standing
1 2 3 4 51
9104. Through use ofFord Learning
Network(FLN) asan intrface to the TMM.
G0neral Salay Roll(S(
U. 6 (MR - Salary Grde
LL S and above (Salay Grade 11 and
9123. Through use ofthe FLN self-
inventory data and resulting learning
solutions.
GeneralSaty -ou (SC
. 6(MR - Say Grde
LL5 and abeve (Salary Grade I I and
17 .Are you irnplementing your itDP
Individual Technical Development Plan)?
General Salary Rolt(SC
IL1 6 (MR - Salary.mde
LL 5 and above (Salary Gradell and.
9176, Do you understand the linkage
between your Tech Club and the TMM?














































































QUESTION Percent of Respondents Category PercentsFavourable Q Neutral f Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Respond*ug Standing
1 2 3 4 5
aL 6(MR -sawby G$de 9 -10) 79 0 0 0 21 14 Sieogth
79% 0% 21%
LL 5 un abow (Salwy GudelI and abov) 80 0 0 0 20 10 Suength
;80% 0% 20%
QUESTION
9109, 1underftad the wed for e
atuty and engnecing exceataP D.
9l10. underutnd tht con4ts an
principleunddngESPiMW.
Category Percents I .
Favcurable Neutral Untavourabl Reqomding Standing
I 2 3 4 5















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable Q Neutral Utdfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
SaM 35 56 2 5 2 62 Strength
92% 2% 6%
Sets ad Resna"ts 39 56 0 0 6 36 Strength
94% 0% 6%
Ot 53 35 0 12 0 17 Strength
88% 0% 12%
114. I believe that the use of ESP/TMM
will strengthen technical creer paths within T0a0 33 39 17 8 3 327 Strength
RD 72% 17% 11%
BxlyStnuture. 34 47 9 8 2 53 Strength
81% 9% 9%
42 38 15 4 2 48 Strength
79% 15% 6%
Extr$yn 22 41 31 3 2 58 Strength
64% 31% 5%
timrorSyane 27 45 20 8 0 49 Strength
n1% 2D% 
"%
33 34 15 11 7 61 Strength
67%15% 18%
Seas ad Rcstain 42 42 3 8 6 36 Strength
83% 3% 14
Ohw 47 19 24 12 0 17 Strength
65% 24% 12%
113, believe that using the TMM ill
mhance my departmeras overall That 34 43 16 6 2 329 Strength
aginering competalcy % 16% 8%
Body snweie 43 41 7 7 2 54 Strength
83% 7% 9
C 0a)m2 42 48 8 2 0 48 Strength
90% 8% 2%
Percent of Respondents Category Percents Mumr
QUESTION M avourable Neutral Unfavourable ravourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
24 50 21 3 2 58 Strwngth
74% 21% 5%
InteriorSys.em$ 24 47 20 8 0 49 Stength
71% 20% 8%
Wely 26 40 19 8 6 62 Strength
stab Nd Rntbwit 47 42 6 3 3 36 Strength
89% 6%6%
5dw I 3 12 24 12 0 17 Strength
65% 24% 12%
9173. 1 believe the ESP/nMM project will
mnrgthen my tCam's ability to memt TaW 29 42 18 9 3 329 StrmngUh
busba n% 18% 12%
BOdySwUwi=Wfl 43 37 9 9 2 54 Strength
80% 9% 1
CIM1614 35 42 19 4 0 48 Strength
77% 19% 4 9
ERacsr%*YA21" 16 53 21 7 3 58 Strength
I9ioe Sytas 16 51 24 8 0 49 Strength
07% 24% 8
sdoy 21 40 21 11 6 62 Strength
61% 21% 18%
S-a- Ed ReEttint 42 42 8 6 3 36 Strength
83% 8% 7
Ode 59 6 12 18 6 17 Strength
% 12% 24%
A- -- --- - - - -
Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable Neutral * Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabkt Responding Standing1 2 3 4 5
9111. lknow how to me the IMM asa
framework for fhnluitaing technical TOW 17 45 22 12 5 327 Strength
eiielopnetn. 3% 22% %
BodySwrum 24 43 19 9 6 54 Strength
Cbejs 26 51 13 I1 0 47 Strength
77% 13% 11%
Enerior Syaem 12 41 29 14 3 58 eixd
3% 29% 17 %A
Imaitur SynAnE E 12 45 20 14 8 49 MWxed
57% 20% 22%I
Wety 5 48 27 15 5 62 MIxed
53%27% 19%
Sem and Raaiats 26 43 17 9 6 35 Strength
17% 14%
Odhr 29 41 12 12 6 17 Strength
71% 12% 18%
9112.1 believe that uviug the TMM will
enhance my technical depth within my TOW1 24 44 19 11 2 329 Strength
functienal aa.1 13%
Bodyft ae ure 24 41 17 11 7 54 Strength
65% 17% 19
CkMMr3 33 40 19 8 0 48 Strength
73% 19% 8
Enejor Sydets 19 52 21 7 2 58 Strength
71% 21% 9
interiorSy"Mnu 22 43 22 12 0 49 Strength
65% 22% 12%
Safety 21 40 21 15 3 62 Strength
61% 21% 18%




170. 1 believe that technical depth was
idequateby considered in recent TOal















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NuubarQUESTION Favourabl 3 Neutral f Unfavouwa1 Fawourable Neutral u&favoural Repuding standing





9182. 1 believe that a fnctionally-based















































































9178. Did you participate in the Body










Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable [ Neutral M Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavowable Responding Standing






1I69. Is technical depthIcanpetence























































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabkt Respanding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
172 Do you feel that you are able to oach 1 1 2 3 4 2 Strength
or help a team member in their technical Trij 71 0 0 0 29 327 Strength
development? 171% 0% 29%
B o d y s aru m 10e% 7 8 0 0 0 2 2 5 5 S tre n g th
78% 0% 22%
Cauvs 77 0 0 0 23 47 Strength
77% 0% 23%
F-erSyse 71 0 0 0 2 58 Strength
71% 0% 29%
= ::r39% 61 0 0 0 39 49 Strength
61% 0% 39%
Sare9 66 0 0 0 34 61 Strength
66% 0% 34%
Sew and Rtm 75 0 0 0 25 36 Strength
75% 0% 25%
Odhr 71 0 0 0 29 17 Strength
1% 0% 29%
9116. As a result of the ESP/TMM training,
I have hada technical development TOWal 53 0 0 0 47 328 Mixed
discussion with my superviuornanager. % 0% 47%
BodyStrwkw 64 0 0 0 36 55 Strength
64% 0% 36
Cbsums 57 0 0 0 43 47 xed
57% 0% 43
Exwiorsystes 62 0 0 0 38 58 Strength
62% 0% 38%
In4rior1syshns 41 0 0 0 59 49 MWxed
1% 0% 59%
56 0 0 0 44 62 Wixed
si% 0% 44
Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumvrQUESTION j Ftvourable [ Neutral * Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding Stamnding
1_ 1 2 3 4 _
Seats and Resraints
Othe
117. This technical development
















9118. Overall, I am satisfied with the
























































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable D Neutral M Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourahl Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 51
Sew
(kho
9100. As a result ofthe ESPrMIM training,
I iave creatod a technical dovcloprntn platL Te&
Se













































































1E O Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable [ Ncutral * Unfavurable favourable Neutral Uniavourabi Rsponding standing




































































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favwuwbl, Neutral Uniwvourable Favourable Neutral Unfavorablk Resownding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9107.Through use ofthe TMM as a
ftnewrk. for detrmiting AptPoriots TOWa 73 0 0 0 25 2DD Strength
technical developmet activitie.V 5% 0% 25%
Body Bunxu 75 0 0 0 25 32 Strength
75% 0% 2%
Claae 75 0 0 0 25 28 Strength
75% 0% 25%
Exeeior syswa 71 0 0 0 29 41 Strength
71% 0% 29%
I01iorSy4s1 86 0 0 0 14 29 St-ength
85% 0% 14%
Sawety 72 0 0 0 28 47 Strength
72% 0% 28%




9103. Through use offord Design lntitute
(FDI) reources. ThaI 36 0 0 0 64 200 Weakness
% 0% 64%
Body Smntae 39 0 0 0 61 33 Weakness
39% 0% 81%
Ckmses 52 0 0 0 48 27 Mxed
52% 0% 48%
ExteiarSy* %% 35 0 0 0 65 40 Weakness
5% 0% 65%
1marysyems 46 0 0 0 4 28 Mxed
48% 0% 54%
27 0 0 0 73 48 Weakness
27% 0% 7%
QUS O Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favouble [ Neutl Uvourabl Favourable Neutral UnfavourabI Responding Staoding
1____ 1 2 .3 4 5 _
Seeb wnd Restianm
Od
9104, Through use otFord Learning















9123. Through use ofthe ILN self-
inventory data and resulting leatning TOW

















































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable Neutral Unfavrabc Favourabe Neutral Unfavourab Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
lteriorSysaen 29 0 0 0 71 28 Weakness
29% 0% 71
saOrY 23 0 0 0 77 48 Weakness
23% 0% 77%




171. Are you implementing your ITDP
'Individual Technical Development Plan)? ToA1 
- 4 0 0 0 16 204 Strength
0% 18%
BodyStrtwres 82 0 0 0 18 33 Strength
82% 0% 18%
Cloeua8 93 0 0 0 7 28 Strength
93% 0% 7%
Sytiar*tesM 85 0 0 0 15 41 Strength
85% 0% 15%
89 0 0 0 11 28 Strength
89% 0% 11
84 0 0 0 16 49 Strength
84% 0% 16%




?t76. Do you understand the linkage
xtween your Tech Club and the TMM? TOal 61 0 0 0 39 54 Strength
1% 0% 39%
Body ftru0tws 63 0 0 0 38 8 Strength
63% 0% 38%1
Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable Neutral Uxfavuurabk Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
csoue 50 0 0 0 50 14 Wxed
50% 0% 50%
EazciorStm, 57 0 0 0 43 14 Mxed
57% 0% 43%
amerior SyeMS 100 0 0 0 0 5 Strength
100% 0% 0%
saety 80 0 0 0 20 5 Strength
80% 0% 20%




QSTION Percent of Respondents Category PercentsQUSTONgFavorble [] NeutW M Unavwrabk( Favorable Neutral Unfavwrable Respodf Sianduag
1 2 3 4 5
9109;1undcrsmadte need r tehnic4








































































QUESTION Favourable Neutral M Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 s' I
,114.1 believe diat the use ofESPITMb




113. 1 believe dat using the TMM will

























































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents b
QUESTION Favourable [J Neutral fl Unvourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabil Responding Standing
j 2 3 4 5
?173. I believe the ESP/TMM project w












T 7% 17% 17%
ill
1% 18% 12%












































I 11. 1 know how to use the TMM as a




9112, I believe that using the TMM will

































Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding standing


























































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable [] Neutral M Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi Responding standing
1 2 3 4 s
Tough iTr: M
M P 91
9170, 1 believe that techmical depth wvs





























































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable [] Neutral * Unfavourable Favourabke Neutral Unlavourabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 1
9182. 1 believe that a flnctionally-base





17$. Did )vu participate in the Body
Engineering Pilot of Pilot? (June-August TOl
Fatily Vctilc Lwno
NA.






















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourab [ Neutral I Unfivourablc Favourable Neutral Unfavourab! Responding Standing







9169. is technical depth/wnipetence



































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents N
QUESTION Favourable [ Neutral * Unavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Rfspondhng Staudflag
1 2 3 4 5
9172. Do you feel that you are able to co




9116. As a result ofthe ESP/IMM traini
I have had a technical development


























































































9117. This technical developmeat
discuasion was btter than pevious one
Fanil
Liatyl
9118. Overal. I am satisfied with the






























Favourable Neutral Unfavoural Responding standing













































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION j Favourable Neutml M Unfavourable Favourable Neutml Unravourabl Responding Statding




















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable ] Neutral M Unfvourable Favourable Neutral Unfhvourabi Responding Stgnug
1 2 3 4 5_
9107. Through use ofthe 1MM as a
framework for detervining appropriate Totl






















































































MM - 8 , m M.
QUESTION
9104. Through use ofFord Leaming
Network (FLN) as an interface to the Tb
FaMU
Lifatyl
9123. Through use ofthe PLN self-






























Favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Rtponding Staiding
1 2 3 4 5 1










































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable D Neutral Unfvourabic Favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Responding Stading
1 2 3 4 s _ I
9171, Areyou implemenring your ITP



















83% 0% 17 0A
Touvi Tnrm* - E%
otd"
9176. Do you understand the linkage

























































Percent of Respondents Category Percents
QUESTION Favourable [3 Neutral Unfavourable Favourabk Neutral Unfavourab Responding Standing
_ 2 3 4 5
Lityqe Vehiw Lim 44 0 0 0 56 9 Wixed
44% 0% 56




Ofm 83 0 0 0 17 12 Strength
83% 0% 17%
Touh Tnrks 46 0 0 0 54 13 Mxed
46 "% 0% 54%
Ul
SPercent of Respondents Category Percents NumbrI
QUESTION Favourable []Neutral0 Unkvorable favouabk Nevtral Unfavourabi Rpouding Stadiag
1 2 3 4 5






ptinciples undriying ES MM. Ta
Beuagi -
B*nwed quieyd
9114, Ibeieve that the use ofESPNTMM




1I3.lbekeve that ing the TMM will


































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION * Favorable Q eala Fae urabk Neutral Unfavoural1 Responding Standing
1_____________ _ 0_ 1 2 3 4 5
)7. I believe: the ESPJ MM project will




S11I. l know how to use the TMM as a




l 12, I believe that using the TMM will


















9170, 1 believe that technical depth was

















Baing tetxesuy de 9





































Percent of Respondents Category Percents J m J
QUESTION Favourable Q Neutral M Unllvourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabi} Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
Beiagtedaaicaly deq
9182. I believe that a functionally-based
PDC5 will enhance my technical
development.
TOl
Being a genl Atis
Beingtechnically d j
9178, Did you participate in the Body




9169. Is technical depth/competence




9172. Do you feel that you are able to coach



















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Ilvourable Q Neutral | Unfavourale Favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5 1
9116. As a result ofthe ESP(IM training.
I have had a technical development




9117. This technical development
discussion was better than previous ones. That
Beings gatatas
Beingtecmically de
9118. Overall. I am satisfied with the




9100 As a result of the ESPflMM training
I have created a technical devopment plan. Tat

























g3 4ng a enrst 































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
Inngteehnicallydeej







107. Through use of the TMM = a
rramework ford etmining appropriate













)104. Through use of Ford Learning




























































.. ... . . im r"m
"M U.I. M...amAffil 0-IN
Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION I Favourable [ Neutral Unfavourable Favoumble Neutral Unfavourabk Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 3
9123. Through use ofthe FLN self-
[ 4wnor " datnand resuthg learning TOW 23 0 0 0 77 199 Weakness
soltins0% T7%
Beinga xnofraila 14 0 0 0 86 78 Weakness
14% 0% 86
Being ehnicay deep 29 0 0 0 71 121 Weakness
29% 0% 71%
9171, Are you impluaenting your 1TDP
(Individual Technical Development Plan)? Toaj 84 0 0 0 16 204 Strength
0% 16%
Being a generlux 82 0 0 0 1 78 Strength
82% 0% 18
eingtecnically d85 0 0 0 15 124 Strength
85% 0% 15
176. Do you understand the linkage
etween your Tech Club and the TMM? rTM) 61 0 0 0 39 54 Strength
1% 0% 39%
Beinga gemafis 52 0 0 0 48 21 Mxed
52% 0% 48
Beingwedhnicallyd 66 0 0 0 34 32 Strength
66% 0% 34%_
Appendix I
SURVEY QUESTIONS FROM AUGUST 2003
ID Question
2949 How many years have you worked at Ford?
8487 What is your Salary Grade/Leadership Level?
9174 What are you told is more important
(generalist/technically deep)?
9175 What do you believe is more valued by the
organization (generalist/technically deep)?
9179 Are you currently an FCG?
9187 In which organization do you work?
9592 With which functional area are you most closely
associated?
9594 Did you access the FLn system for your ITDP?
9595 Have you received ESP/TMM training?
9596 Do you know your PDC5 representative?
9597 Have you met with your PDC5 rep to discuss
your development?
9601 Of those communications you receive, please
select the 2 that you find most valuable for getting
news about what's going on in ESP/TMM.
9602 How often do you prefer to receive ESP
communications?
9603 Have you visited the ESP website?
9100 As a result of the ESP/TMM training, I have
created a technical development plan.
9103 My technical development plan was enhanced:
Through use of Ford Design Institute (FDI)
resources.
9104 My technical development plan was enhanced:
Through use of the Ford Learning Network
(FLN) as an interface to the TMM.
9105 My technical development plan was enhanced: A
discussion with my supervisor/manager.
9106 My technical development plan was enhanced:

























9107 My technical development plan was enhanced: Yes/No
Through use of the TMM as a framework for
determining appropriate technical development
activities.
9109 I understand the need for technical maturity and 1-5 Range
engineering excellence within PD.
9110 I understand the concepts and principles 1-5 Range
underlying ESP/TMM.
9111 I know how to use the TMM as a framework for 1-5 Range
facilitating technical development.
9112 I believe that using the TMM will enhance my 1-5 Range
technical depth with my functional area.
9114 I believe that the use of ESP/TMM will 1-5 Range
strengthen technical career paths within PD.
9117 This technical development discussion was better 1-5 Range
than previous ones.
9118 Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the 1-5 Range
discussion that I had with my
supervisor/manager
9123 My technical development plan was enhanced: Yes/No
Through use of the FLM self-inventory data and
resulting learning solutions.
9169 Is technical depth/competence emphasized more Yes/No
today than it was at this time last year?
9171 Are you implementing your ITDP (Individual Yes/No
Technical Development Plan)?
9172 Do you feel that you are able to coach or help a Yes/No
team member in their technical development?
9173 I believe the ESP/TMM project will strengthen 1-5 Range
my team's ability to meet business needs.
9182 I believe that a functionally-based PDC5 will 1-5 Range
enhance my technical development.
9590 During 2003, I have had a technical development Yes/No
discussion with my supervisor/manager.
9591 During the technical development discussion, the Yes/No
ITDP was used as a tool to guide my technical
development.
9598 The new Senior Engineer classification (SG 08) is 1-5 Range
a step in the right directiOn toward creating more
opportunities for a technical career path in PD.
9599 The new Technical Specialist positions (which are 1-5 Range
implementation focused) are creating more
143
opportunities for technical career paths in PD.
9600 I am satisfied with the training resources that are 1-5 Range
available to meet my technical needs
9604 How useful is the ESP website for supporting 1-5 Range
your understanding of technical development
within PD and related activities?
9605 As a result of PD's focus on ESP/TMM, I am 1-5 Range




DEMOGRAPHIC RESULTS FROM AUGUST 2003 SURVEY
Npmber Pet ofQUESTION Responding Total
2949. How many years have you worked at Ford?
0 - 5 years 136 28
6 - 10 years 123 26
31 - IS years 111 23
16 - 20 years 28 6
21 - 25years 31 6
26 - 30 years 31 6
More than 30 years 22 5
8487. What is your Salary Grade i Leadership Level?
General Salary Roll (SO 1 - 8) 341 70
LL 6 (MR - Salasy Grade 9 - 1O) 129 27
LL 5 and above (Salary Grade I I and above) 15 3
9174. What are you told is more important?
Being a generalist 48 10
Being technically deep 423 90
9175. What do you believe is more valued by the organization?
Being a generalist 169 36
Being technically deep 296 64
9179. Are you currently an FCG?
Yes 5 1
No 478 99




,.T, Number Pct ofQUESTION Responding Total
2002 2 50
9187. In which organization do you work?
NAE 191 41
SUV & BOF 102 22
PT&C 43 9
Small FWD & RWD 65 14
Medium & Large FWD & AWD 64 14




9594, Did you access the FLn system for your ITDP?
Yes 153 32
No 324 68
9595, Have you received ESP/MfM training?
ESPf1IM training 487 100
9596. Do you know your PDC5 representative?
Yes 203 60
No 138 40




9601, Of those communications you receive, please select the 2
that you find most valuable fbr getting news about what's going
on in ESPITMM.
Cascade meetings with my management (e.g, All 292 33
Hands)
146
QUESTION Number I eror
I Responding Total
Local PD Communications (e,g,, ESP Proof Points e-
mail newsletters, e-mails from local PD Leadership,
etc.)
Staff Meetings with PD supervisor
ESP website
Conversations with colleagues








































)114.1 befit ttthe u of EP;TMM wifi
trthen technicalcve paths within PD.
)173.1 bei evethe ESP/MMprojeawii
renathen n teamis ability to amt busincs
teedst
)I11.1 knowhowto uetheTMMa aframmrk
orfailidttin ethical dielopment.
0. 1 satisfemd wih the trainingraours that
we availableto meet my teclcalneeds.
1112.1 behiewethoaat ig the TMMwillenhanoce
ny technical depth within 1my lactiowl sea
)59, Thenew etio Bninwrlasifation (80
)8)is a step in the fight direction toward craing
noeopportihitia for a technieg crer path in PD
)99, ThenewTechn ialistpositios
which are Impkuntion fcue darecreatng
Tare opportaitia for technical are pathsin PD.
)05 AsamitofPD'sfcusonESPRTMM,1 am
nteratal incontuinaondaaechnidcare path.
82A1 beievethatafww-tionaay-basa PDC$ il
thatcemy twchmaldealopnmot
Percent of Respondents

















ourable Neural Unfavurabl1  apotadiag Standing
























9169. Is technical depth/onwetence emphasized
more today than it was at this time last year?
9172. Do you feel that you are able to coach or help
a team nember in their technical development?
9590. During 2003,1 have had a technical
development discussion with my
supervisor/manager,
959t. During the technical development discussion-
the TDP was used as a tool to guide my technical
development,
9117. This technical development discussion vws
better than previous ones,
9118. Overall, I an satisfhod with the quality of the
discussion that I had with Wy supervisor/manager.
9100. As a result ofthe ESP/TMM trainin. I have
rated a technical development plan
9105. My technical development plan was
enhanced by: A discussion with nry
supervisor/manewr.
9106, My technical development plan was
mhanced by; Interactions with my peers.
9107. My technical development plan was
mhanced: Through use of the TMM as a
lramework for determining appropriate technical
9103. My technical development plan was
nhanced: Through use of Ford Design Institute
:FDI) resources.
)104. My technical devlopment plan was
nhanced: Through use of Ford Learning Network
















Favourable Neutral Unfavurable Responding Swundkig
















































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favoumble Q Neutral Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unflvouable Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9123 My twchnical development pn was
enhanced Through use of the FLn sdf-inventory
data andresultirng learnig solutions.
9171. Are you ixplementingyour lTDP (Individual
Technical Development Plan)?
9604. How usefU4 is the ESP website for supporting
your understanding of technical development







0 0 0 75
0 0 0 21








Perent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Fa abi [] Neutral Unavourable Favourable Neutrl Unfavourable Responding Stading
1 2 3 4 5




U,5 ad "o-c urS* Grade




LL5U and (Samly Grade
9114.1 beieve that the use ofFSPlIM




IL S and o-eulay Grade
iti TOal
0% 2% 2



















































Percent of Respondents Category Percents
QUESTION Favourable [ Neutral F Uvourable avoUrahk Ncutral Unftv uratil Responding Standig
1 2 3 4 5
9173. I believe the ESP/TMM project will
Sirengthen my teamas ability to meet Tota
business needs.
Guieral Satiny Roll(5G I - S
LL6 (MR - Salary Grada9 -10)
LL 5 aid above (Salary Grade 11 and aboe)
9111 I know how to use the TMM as a
1ramework for facilitaingtechnical Tote
General Salay Roll,(SO 1 -
LL6(MR sabyGrade9-J0)
IL 5 and above (SaiMy Grade II and above)
9600. I am satisfied with the training
resources th* are available i meet my Toal
wechnual needs.
General Salay Roll(SG I - 8)
LL 6 (MR - Sary Grad9 - 101
115 ad above Salmy Grade 11 aid abovei
9112 i behibve that using the TMM will
enhancemy technicaldepth within my Total
fuinctianal area.










































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NambwrQUESTION Favourable Neutral * Unfavourable favourable Neutral Unfavourable RAspodig Standing
_ 2 3 4 5
LA 6 JMR -Salary
LL$ ad abwe Salary Grade
L598. The new Senivr Engineer
c aifiation (So 08) is a step in the rig
dreCtin toward creatingmore opportun
For a technacal career path in Pt);
Clnoral Saay F
LL6 (MR - Sal-ay
L 5 and above (Salary Grade
599. The new Technical Specialist
psilions (whieh are implenentation
ocused) are creaung more opportunities
ehaical career pnths in PD
General Sala r
LL6(MR -Salary
13 5ad above (Salary Grade,
9605. As a result ofPD'x focus on
ESP/Mi I am interested in continuinj
a technical career path.
General Salary S
LL6 (MR - Salary
L 5 and ab(Ne (Salay Grade



































































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION FavNOurable 0 Neutral M Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unflavourabli Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9182. I belitv* that afnctionallybasi
PDC5 will enhance my technical.
deVelopment
General Satary RoU (SC
9169. Is technical depthkcompetence
erphasined mo today than it was at this
time last year?
General Salmy IRoh (SG
LL6 (MR -Salary Grade
U, 5 and above (Salary Grade It ada
9172. Do you feel that you are able to coach
or help a team member in their technical
development?
General SalMy RoU (SC
LL6 (MR -Salary Grade
LL 5 ma above (Salay Grade It and
9590. During 2003, 1 have had a technical
devclopment dacussion with my
Gemral Sataiy Rohl(SG
LL 6 (MR - Salary Grade






































































[ Percent of Respondents f Category Percents JNiumberQUESTION Favourable Efl Neutral * tnfavourable Favourabe Neutra Unavourabi fospondiag Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9591. During the technical development
discussion, the ITDP was used as a tool to
guide my technical dVlopmen.-
cnkrst Salmy Rol
LL 6 (MR - Salstr 0
LL and above (Salay Orade I t
9117. This technical development discussi
was better than previous ones.
Generat Salary Rol
LL6 (MR -Salary G
IL S and above (-alary Grade 1.1
Pl 18. Overall, I am satisfied with the quah




L 5 and above Salary Grade It
)100, As a result ofthe ESP/TMM trauininl
Ihave creaed a technical development pla
General salary Rol
Total


























































Q I Percent of Respondents Category 'Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable E Neutral * Unfavourable Favourmble NeutraW Unfavourabl Responding Sanding
1 2 3 4 5
LL6(4R-Salay
.L S ad above (Salaty Grade
9105 My technical development planw




LL 5 md above (alay Grade
9106, My technical development plan w,
enhanced by. Inteactions with my peas
GCawral Sal air
LL6(MR-Salary
ILL and above (Salary Grade
9107. My technical development plan w
enhanced: Through use ofthe TMM as a

































































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable Q Neutral * Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavurabl Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9103. My technical development plan was
enhanced: Through use ofFord Deamgn
Institute(FDO) resources.
Goeeral Saviy R
LL.6 (MR - Sawiny
LL 5 n abowe (alary Grade I
9104, My technical development plan w
enhanced- Through use ofFord Learning
Network (FLn) as an interface to the TM.
Genwral salmny I
LL 6 (MR - Salary
LL 5 and above (Salary Grade 1
9123. My technical development plan wa
enhanced Through ,me of the FLn sdf-




LL 5 and above (Salary Grade i
9171. Are you implementing your lTDP
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Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable E Neutral FUnftvourable avourable N utral Unflvourable Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
LL6 (MR -Salmy Grado9 10
1LSand Wo"e (Salay Grade i 1nd above
904, How eful is the ESP websie for
supportingyourunderstandingoftechnical TotAl
development witn Pand related
acdivitics?
Ganral Saey RonU(SG 1-
LL6(MR-SalnyGradC9- 10
00
















































Percent of Respondents Category Pertents Nm J
QUESTION * avotuk [ NWrW M Udwoumbe Favourabe NautrA Unfavotable Rspending Studiag
1 2 3 4 5
A 09. 1 wderwandthfcnod for techniWa
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Petent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Fravunble Q Neutral * Unrvfourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourable K ponding Standing
j 2 3 4 5
114, 1 believe that the use of EsP/r IM




Medi & Large FWD
9173.1 believe the ESP/TMM project will




Median & Ligo FWD
9111, 1 know howw rnthe TMM as a












































































MedIaa & Lwage FWD &
9600. 1 am satisied with the Ma iing




Median & Large FWD &
9112.1 be1ieve that using the TMM will
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Percent of Respondents Category Percents NuierQUESTION Favourable 0 Neutral * Unftwourable Favourable Neutral UnfaVOUrabi Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
Small FWD &RWD
Median & L4rge FWD & AWL
9598, The new Senior Engineer
olasification (SG 08) is a slop in the right Total
direction toward cremingmore opporumities




Small PWD & RWD
Medium & Large FWD & AWD
)99, ThenewTedinical Specialist
:ositions (which ae implmnentation Total
Rcused) are reating more opportunities for













































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable El Neutral M Unfavourable Favou.rable Neutral Unfavouable Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9605. As a resultofPD's focus on
ESP/ MM, I arn interested in conitingngon
a technieai care path.
SUV
Sntl FWD
Mediun & Large FWD
9182; 1 believe that a functionally-based




Media & Large FWD
9169, Is technical depthonpetence











































































QUESTO Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable ] Neutral * Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
SmallF
Mediwn & Lage F
9172. Do you fel that you are able to co
or help a team meavbtr in their technical
jevelopment?
small F
Median & Largo F
9590, During 2003, I have had a technics























































































QUESTION Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Fawurabe E Neutml * Unfavourabe Favourable Neutra1 Unfavourabe Pespondiug Stauding
1 2 3 4 5
Small
Medawn & Large
9591 During the technical development
diac sion, the TDP was Med a a twol
guide my technial development.
Smsall
Mrdiu & Large
9117. This technical devehapment diwu

















































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents N umberQUESTION Favouable [] Neutral * Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Responiding Standiag
1 2 3 4 5
f118. OveralI, I an satatdwnhthe quality





Median" A Lxge FWD.
9100. As a result ofthe ESPITM training
[ have created a technical development plan.
SUN
SmaIll
Median & Large P
910$. My technical development plan wa

































































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable El Neutral Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Responding Stmndig
1 2 3 4 5
sma.F
Median & Large F
9106. My technical development plan w
enhanced by: Interactions with my peer&.
SinalF
MediM & Lrge F
9107. My technical development plan w
hmced: Through use of the TMM as a
































































































)103 My technical development
-nhxtcqd. Through use ofFord D
Institutt(FDI) resources.
Mediiu &
(104. My technical developmentj
enhanced: Through use ofFord L
Network (FLa) as an interface to 1
Median &
Percent of Respondents
Favourable Neutral * Unfvourale
Small FWD& RWD
66% 0% 34%











Small FWD & RWD
45% 0% 55%













Large FWD & AWD
32% 0% 68%
Category Percents Number
Favourmble Neutral Unfavourabl tespoj ing Standing












































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favourable El Neutral Unfavourable Pavourable Neutral Unfavourabl Respondialg Standing
1 2 3 4 5
123. My techniml development plan was
hanced: Through use of the FLn self Total




Sumu FWD & RWD
MwihA & Larte FWD & AWD
171. Are you implementingyour ITDP




Modian A Large FWD & AWD
9604. 14ow useful iS the FSP VbSite for
iupportingyour undm ingotLchual Total









































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION * Favourable Neutral * Unfavourable favourable Neutal Unfawurable Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
sUv & 9OF 3 55 25 15 3 40 MIxed
58% 25% 18%
&C 0 38 38 25 0 24 Veakness
38% 38% 25%
Small FWD & RWD 8 24 44 20 4 25 *skness
32 4% 24I
Median, &Large FWD & AW 0 31 46 12 12 26 *WmAkess
31% 46%2%
QUESTION
9109.1 inersundthe need for wehniw
mAturity and engiecing t=10=c %itin
PD.
9110. Iderstand the cptsand
princies uadyin ESPIrMM
91141 believ tatheuse faESPIMM
"D seom techkni vw p itin
PD,


















Favourable Neutral Unfavurable Responding Standing








































P173. 1 believe the lSP/TMM project will
strngthen miy team s ability to meet
Lsiness needs.
9111 1 know how to use the TMM as a
framework for facittingtechmcal
4evelopnent
9600. 1 am satisfied with the training
resources that are available to meet my
technical needs
9112,1 believe that usig the TMM will























Favourable Neutral Unfavourabll Responding Standing






























Percent of Respondents Category Percents J
QUESTION Favourable [] Neutral * Unftwourable F oumble Neutral Unfavourabl Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
(liagan
Cuba
.598. The new Senior Engineer
:assifilin (SG 08) is siepin the right
direction toward creating more opportunities
for a technical career path in PD
9599. The new Technical Specialist
positions (which are implementation
focuscd) are creating more opportunities for
technical career paths in PD.
4605, As a result of PD's focus on






















































































































Percent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable f Neutral Unfvourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourablc RMPOUd5ng Standing
1 2 3 4 5
9182. 1 believe that a functionaly-batsed





9169, Is tccnicad dcpthkompetence
















1 72. Do you feE that you are able to coach
x help a team member in their techmcal
kvdopment?
9590. During 2003, 1 have had a technical











































































QUESTIO Penent of Respondents Category Percents Number
QUESTION Favourable [3 Neutral Unfavourable favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5
chmis
91. During the technical development
scussion, the 1TDP was used as a tool to Total
ide my technical development
9117. This technecal developnwnt discussion
was better than previous ones.
91 18. Overall, I an satisfied with the quality

















































































9100. As a result ofthe ESP/TMM training,
haw created a techmoal development plan.
9105. My technical development plan was
:oanoed by: A discussion with oy
perviso/Imanaer.
9106. My technical development plan was
enhanced by: Interactions with my peers.
9107. My technical development plan was





























Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Responding































































QUESTION Perment of Respondents Category PercentsU TFavourable 0 Neutral * Unfavourable Favourable Neutral Unfavourabl Raspanding Smatding
1 2 3 4 5
103, My technical development plan was
enhanced; Through use ofFord Design
fistitute(FDI) resources.
104. My technical development plan was
enhaiced: Through use of Ford Learning
Network (FLn) as an interface to the 'MM.
.)123, My technical development plan was
,nan=; Through uSe of the PLn self-




















0 0 0 23
0 0 55
44 0 0 0 56
45 0 0 0 55
28 0 0 0 72
27 0 0 0 73
29 0 0 0 71

























25 0 0 0 75 206 Weakness












Percent of Respondents Category Percents NumberQUESTION Favvurable [ Neutral Mi Unfavoumrble Favourable Neutral LJnfavOurnbt Responding Standing
1 2 3 4 5




904-How useful is the ESP website ffx
supportingyourundwstandi oftechnical TqWt










































56% 22% " 22%
305
208
93
3
197
122
65
9
Strength
Strength
Strength
Insufficient
Date
Mxed
Mixed
Weakness
Mixed
